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THE PURPOSES OF STUDENT LOANS
John Patrick Hunt*
ABSTRACT
Student loans, unlike other debts, are not dischargeable in bankruptcy
unless the debtor starts a special proceeding and proves that repayment
would cause “undue hardship.” This requirement probably accounts for
the fact that only a tiny fraction of bankrupt debtors succeed in discharging
their student loans. This article is the first to make the case that student-
loan nondischargeability interferes with achieving the student-loan pro-
grams’ goals and to propose solutions that courts and the Department of
Education (the Department) can employ under current law.
The article draws on the legislative history of the student-loan programs
to establish that they serve at least four distinct purposes: providing equal-
ity of access to higher education, educating the population for the benefit of
the country, enabling students’ free choice of career, and providing a bene-
fit to students.
The article then looks to the empirical literature and to fundamental
precepts of bankruptcy law to show that nondischargeability can thwart the
purposes of the student-loan programs through four different effects: deter-
ring students from higher education, distorting career choice, discouraging
borrowers from economic and social participation, and rendering student
loans harmful to borrowers.
Accordingly, nondischargeability should be applied narrowly, only in
situations where its goals are advanced without undue interference with
other goals of the programs. The article offers ideas for tempering each of
the four negative effects. To avoid deterring education, the fact that bank-
ruptcy relief often can be had if requested should be made more salient. To
combat distortion of career choice, bankruptcy courts should stop ruling
that debtors should abandon lower-paying jobs for which their education
has prepared them. To mitigate borrower discouragement and harm, courts
and the Department should take account of the likelihood of these effects
in deciding on discharge. The debt-income ratio may be a proxy for dis-
couragement, and inability to find a job in one’s field may be a proxy for
harm.
* Professor of Law and Martin Luther King, Jr. Research Scholar, University of Cal-
ifornia, Davis School of Law (King Hall), jphunt@ucdavis.edu. Thanks to King Hall Dean
Kevin Johnson and Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs Afra Afsharipour for
financial support. Thanks also to Matthew Bruckner, Katherine Florey, Jonathan Glater,
and Bob Lawless for helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
CYNTHIA Matthews-Hamad worked as a Salvation Army coun-selor1 and was at the top of her field.2 But her field did not payenough to allow her to repay her student loans, and she sought
relief in bankruptcy.3 The bankruptcy court denied relief and told her to
leave a career for which she had trained and in which she had found suc-
cess in order to get higher-paying work.4 The message was that certain
occupations are closed off except to those who can pay for their educa-
tion up front. Surely that was not what Congress intended in creating the
student-loan programs—and as this article demonstrates, it wasn’t.
This article is the first sustained critique of student-loan nondis-
chargeability5 as a matter of student-loan law, not just bankruptcy law. It
analyzes how nondischargeability relates to the overall goals of the stu-
dent-loan programs and argues for the first time that an overly strict ap-
proach to student-loan bankruptcy thwarts the overarching purposes of
the student-loan programs. In so doing, the article offers a new account of
the purpose of student-loan programs, based on primary source research,
and a new account of the effects of loan nondischargeability on borrow-
ers, based on a review of the latest empirical literature. The article also
offers novel approaches for tempering nondischargeability’s harm to the
student-loan programs’ purposes.
This work lies at the intersection of bankruptcy law and higher-educa-
tion law. A substantial bankruptcy literature addresses student-loan
nondischargeability,6 but it generally does not draw on the purposes of
the student-loan programs to make its points.7 In education law, many
scholars have written on the purposes of financial aid under the Higher
1. See Matthews-Hamad v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Matthews-Hamad), 377
B.R. 415, 419 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
2. See id. at 422. Although the court cites only Matthews-Hamad’s own assertion to
this effect, the claim apparently was undisputed.
3. See id. at 419.
4. See id. at 422.
5. Most student debt is nondischargeable in bankruptcy, absent a showing of “undue
hardship.” See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). This article uses the shorthand term “nondis-
chargeability” to refer to this conditional nondischargeability of student-loan debt. See dis-
cussion infra Part III.
6. For recent examples, see AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, FINAL REPORT OF
THE ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY (2019) [hereinafter ABI COMMISSION
REPORT]; Alexei Alexandrov & Dalie´ Jime´nez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the
Private Student Loan Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 175 (2017); Matthew Bruckner,
Dalie´ Jime´nez & Chrystin Ondersma, A No-Contest Discharge for Uncollectable Student
Loans, COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Dalie´ Jime´nez et al., Comments of Bankruptcy
Scholars on Evaluating Hardship Claims in Bankruptcy, 21 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 114
(2018); Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1115
(2016).
7. In an article reporting that holding a college degree did not decrease the likelihood
that African-Americans would file for bankruptcy, Professor Abbye Atkinson recognized
the tension between nondischargeability and the goals of the student-loan programs. See
Abbye Atkinson, Race, Educational Loans, and Bankruptcy, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 22
(2010) (“With one hand Congress giveth, encouraging students to borrow for school, yet
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Education Act8 (HEA), but they by and large have not drawn a connec-
tion to student bankruptcy.9 While Professor Jonathan Glater has dis-
cussed the purposes of the HEA10 and how debt financing can harm
students11 and undermine those purposes,12 his work has not emphasized
the implications of his research for bankruptcy law.13
This article’s foundation is its review of the purposes of the student-
loan programs. The article identifies four distinct purposes that Congress
has sought to achieve through decades of student-loan legislation: provid-
ing equal access to higher education;14 creating an educated population
for the country’s benefit;15 minimizing the distorting effect of debt on
career choice;16 and—critically, and perhaps controversially—providing a
benefit to students rather than harming them.17
The article then describes four likely effects of nondischargeability that
probably interfere with achieving the goals Congress has established.
First, nondischargeability likely deters people from getting an education
in the first place.18 The empirical literature shows that fear of debt deters
some from starting higher education and that excessive debt deters others
from finishing. Nondischargeability can magnify both these effects by
making debt inescapable and, therefore, more frightening and
unmanageable.
Second, nondischargeability likely distorts some students’ career
choices by leading them to pursue higher-paying jobs rather than lower-
paying jobs that may make better use of their education or that may be
with the other hand Congress taketh away, not mitigating the financial vulnerability and
risks involved with this sort of borrowing with the safety net of bankruptcy.”).
8. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219.
9. See, e.g., Matthew Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J.
223, 250–51 (2018) (discussing the purpose of federal higher-education support under the
HEA in the context of bankruptcy of higher-education institutions).
10. See Jonathan D. Glater, To the Rich Go the Spoils: Merit, Money, and Access to
Higher Education, 43 J.C. & U.L. 195, 210–17 (2017) [hereinafter Glater, To the Rich Go
the Spoils]; Jonathan D. Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity in Higher Education Access, 79 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 92–95 (2016) [hereinafter Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity];
Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1561,
1579 (2015) [hereinafter Glater, Student Debt and Higher Education Risk]; Jonathan D.
Glater, The Other Big Test: Why Congress Should Allow College Students to Borrow More
Through Federal Aid Programs, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 37–41 (2011) [here-
inafter Glater, The Other Big Test].
11. See Glater, The Other Big Test, supra note 10, at 30.
12. See Glater, To the Rich Go the Spoils, supra note 10, at 195–96; Glater, Debt,
Merit, and Equity, supra note 10, at 101–04, 107; Glater, Student Debt and Higher Educa-
tion Risk, supra note 10, at 1585.
13. Professor Glater may not have discussed the proper bankruptcy treatment of stu-
dent loans in light of the student-loan programs’ purposes because he does not view bank-
ruptcy as a viable response to the problems of student debt. See Glater, Student Debt and
Higher Education Risk, supra note 10, at 1594 (amending Bankruptcy Code “does not ad-
dress the underlying shift of higher education risk”).
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
18. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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more personally rewarding or socially valuable.19 It is well-documented
that educational debt has this effect, and nondischargeability can worsen
the effect by magnifying the risk the student assumes when taking a
lower-paying job. Bankruptcy court decisions that deny student-loan dis-
charge because the court believes the debtor should switch jobs to make
more money directly interfere with career choice. Some decisions even go
so far as to instruct the debtor to leave a lower-paying field for which the
debtor has been trained in order to take a higher-paying job elsewhere to
repay loans. Such reasoning is particularly harmful to Congress’s pur-
poses, because it tends to deprive society of the benefits of the debtor’s
education.
Third, nondischargeability probably discourages some borrowers from
participating in the economy and society.20 The idea that excessive non-
dischargeable debt leads debtors to drop out, called the “debt overhang”
thesis, has been fundamental to bankruptcy law for over eighty years. It
also is backed by empirical research: taking a portion of workers’ earn-
ings, as debt service does, reduces labor supply. When student-loan debt-
ors withdraw, the student-loan programs’ goals of benefiting society
through education, enabling free choice of career, and benefiting students
all fail.
Fourth, nondischargeability perpetuates the harmfulness of some stu-
dents’ loans, defeating Congress’s goal of providing a benefit to student
borrowers.21 An extensive body of research documents harms that arise
from indebtedness, particularly unmanageable indebtedness. Although
the benefits of education outweigh these harms for many student borrow-
ers, this is not true for all student borrowers. Student loans have made
some borrowers worse off, harming rather than helping them.
Having reviewed nondischargeability’s negative effects, the article of-
fers suggestions for moderating them. First, it explains that nondis-
chargeability’s interference with broad student-loan program goals is a
reason to apply the open-ended nondischargeability provision more nar-
rowly than would otherwise be the case.22 Congress enacted nondis-
chargeability to combat borrower opportunism and promote creditor
financial recovery. It should be applied only when doing so clearly serves
those purposes and does not unduly impede achieving the other goals of
the student-loan programs.
Next, the article establishes that bankruptcy is a valuable tool to cope
with the problems of unmanageable student debt. Importantly, courts and
the Department of Education (the Department) can use that tool today,
without the congressional action that most other proposals require.23
19. See discussion infra Part III.B.
20. See discussion infra Part III.C.
21. See discussion infra Part III.D.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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The article then addresses each of the specific negative effects of
nondischargeability that it identifies. To counter the first effect—deter-
rence of education—the Department should educate borrowers about the
fact that student-loan discharge is actually granted fairly often when it is
requested.24 Currently, the Department tells prospective borrowers that
discharge is available only in “rare” cases.25 It can do better.
To counter the second effect—career distortion—bankruptcy courts
should stop denying discharges on the ground that debtors should change
jobs to earn more money.26 At a minimum, they should do so where debt-
ors are working in the field for which they have been trained. In light of
Congress’s purposes of promoting access, education, and career choice,
this approach is sound despite arguments that it encourages “worthless
degrees.”
To combat the third effect—debt overhang—bankruptcy courts and the
Department should try to identify debtors who are likely to be discour-
aged by their debts and grant or consent to discharge in such cases.27 The
debt-income ratio is a promising candidate for a proxy for debt overhang,
and the Department could experiment with forgiving some high debt-in-
come ratio debtors to test the relationship.
To alleviate the fourth effect—nondischargeability renders some stu-
dent loans harmful to debtors—the judiciary and the Department could
consider granting or consenting to discharge where loans are harming a
debtor who has acted in good faith.28 It is not always easy to tell whether
loans have harmed a debtor, given the nonfinancial costs of student loans
and nonfinancial benefits of education. The article suggests that where
the debtor’s education was aimed at a particular field, debtor harm could
be presumed if the debtor cannot find a job in that field. Where training
is not directed at a specific field, harm could be presumed if the debtor
does not earn, after accounting for loan payments, at least as much as the
median person of the education level the debtor was at before taking out
the loans.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II identifies critical purposes of
the student-loan programs. Part III argues that nondischargeability has
four effects that interfere with achieving those purposes. Part IV pro-
poses measures to address each of the effects identified in Part III.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1. The influential Brunner opinion said it was an-
nouncing a “draconian” test that made bankruptcy relief from student loans “very diffi-
cult” and reserved it for “extreme circumstances.” See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ.
Servs. Corp (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff’d, 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1987) (per curiam). However, in practice, only some courts have applied the Brunner test
so harshly. Compare Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightful), 267
F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding Brunner test requires showing a “certainty of hope-
lessness” of repayment), with Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1310
(10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that in applying Brunner, “courts need not require a certainty
of hopelessness”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1–4.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1–4.
27. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1–4.
28. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1–4.
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II. THE FEDERAL STUDENT-LOAN PROGRAMS
AND THEIR PURPOSES
Part II demonstrates that Congress has repeatedly embraced four goals
for federal student-loan programs: equal access to education, freedom of
choice of career, producing an educated population for the benefit of the
country, and benefiting students. The part does not pretend to give an
exhaustive legislative history of the programs.29 An entire law-review ar-
ticle probably could not accomplish such a task given the scale of the
enterprise: the federal student-loan programs have existed since 1958 and
have been part of the HEA since it was enacted in 1965. The HEA has
been formally reauthorized eight times,30 and at least five other statutes
have made significant changes to the student-loan programs.31 Instead of
absolute completeness, Part II offers observations about recurring
themes. In so doing, it reports the results of considerable research and
provides the fullest picture of the programs’ purposes of which the author
is aware.32
29. For a summary of the history of the student-loan programs through 2005, see AN-
GELICA CERVANTES ET AL., TG RESEARCH & ANALYTICAL SERVS., OPENING THE DOORS
TO HIGHER EDUCATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT 40 YEARS
LATER (2005).
30. Reauthorizations occurred in 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1986, 1992, 1998, and 2008.
See id. at iii (listing reauthorizations through 2005); Reauthorization of the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/educators/reauthorization.phtml [https://
perma.cc/3U2M-AL3W] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (listing reauthorizations, including 2008
reauthorization).
31. The five statutes referenced in the text are the Middle Income Student Assistance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1981,
Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-66, 107 Stat. 312; the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
84, 121 Stat. 784; and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. All are discussed in the article text.
32. The author has reviewed the following materials. For the Higher Education Act of
1965: Higher Education Act of 1965: Hearings on H.R. 3220 and Similar Bills Before the
Spec. Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 89th Cong. (1965) [hereinaf-
ter 1965 HEA Hearings]; S. REP. NO. 89-673 (1965); H.R. REP. NO. 89-621 (1965) (Conf.
Rep.); 111 CONG. REC. 21,876-948 (1965).
For the Middle-Income Student Assistance Act of 1978: Middle Income Student Assis-
tance Act: Hearing on H.R. 10854 Before the H. Subomm. on Post-Secondary Educ. of the
H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 95th Cong. (1978) [hereinafter 1978 MISAA Hearings]; S.
REP. NO. 95-643 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-951 (1978).
For the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993: Student Loan Reform: Hearing on
S. 920 Before the S. Comm. on Lab. & Hum. Res., 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter 1993
OBRA Hearings]; H.R. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993); H.R. REP. NO. 103-213 (1993) (Conf.
Rep.); 139 CONG. REC. 9,441 (1993).
For the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007: Paying for a College Education:
Barriers and Solutions for Students and Families: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On
Higher Educ., Lifelong Learning & Competitiveness of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab.,
110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter 2007 CCRAA Hearings]; H.R. REP. NO. 110-317 (2007)
(Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 110-210 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 18,486 (2007); 153 CONG.
REC. 19,424 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 19,715 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 19,885 (2007); 153
CONG. REC. 23,861 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 23,915 (2007); President’s Statement on Sign-
ing the College Cost Reduction and Access Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1244 (Sept. 27, 2007).
For the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010: H.R. REP. NO. 111-232
(2009); 155 CONG. REC. 21,842 (2009); 155 CONG. REC. 21,951 (2009); 156 CONG. REC.
4,132 (2010); 156 CONG. REC. 4,791 (2010).
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A. OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAMS
Part II.A provides a brief background about the student-loan programs
that is helpful in understanding the rest of Part II. Loans are outstanding
today under three major federal student-loan programs. The oldest and
smallest33 has its roots in the post-Sputnik 1958 National Defense Educa-
tion Act,34 under which the federal government provided higher educa-
tion institutions with funds to make loans to students.35 The program
continued as the Perkins Loan Program until 2017.36
The middle program, in terms of both age and size, is the Federal Fam-
ily Education Loan (FFEL) Program, which has its roots in the Guaran-
teed Student Loan Program created by the 1965 HEA.37 The HEA
marked a major turning point in student lending, and this article discusses
it extensively. Under the FFEL program, private lenders made student
loans that were ultimately guaranteed by the federal government.38 Con-
gress terminated the FFEL program in 2010.39
The newest and largest program is the William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program. Under this program, created by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA),40 the federal government makes
loans directly to students.
B. PURPOSES OF THE FEDERAL STUDENT-LOAN PROGRAMS
Part II.B reviews four major purposes of the student-loan programs:
providing equal access to higher education, producing an educated popu-
lation for the benefit of the nation, providing students freedom of career
choice, and granting a benefit to students.
1. Providing Equality of Access to Higher Education
Higher education access regardless of economic circumstance is proba-
bly the goal of federal student-loan programs most commonly cited in the
33. For data on the amounts outstanding under the three programs, see U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Federal Student Aid Portfolio Summary, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed
.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio [https://perma.cc/Z4PK-WCA9] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2019) (reporting outstanding amount of $6.9 billion under the Perkins program,
$277.0 billion under the FFEL program, and $1,163.3 billion under the Ford program as of
the first quarter of 2019).
34. Pub. L. No. 85-864, §§ 201–09, 72 Stat. 1580, 1583–87 (1958).
35. See id.
36. See Jack O’Brien, Congress Fails to Reauthorize Federal Perkins Loan Program,
INSIDE SOURCES: NH J. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.insidesources.com/congress-fails-
reauthorize-federal-perkins-loan-program-heres-impact-students/ [https://perma.cc/25W7-
ZZMC].
37. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, §§ 421–35, 79 Stat. 1219,
1236–48.
38. See John Patrick Hunt, Consent to Student-Loan Bankruptcy Discharge, 95 IND.
L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (explaining the structure of the FFEL program).
39. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152,
§§ 2201–08, 124 Stat. 1029, 1074–77 (2010) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1071
(2012)).
40. Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 4001–4301, 107 Stat. 312, 340–78 (1993) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) (2012)).
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legislative history. A glimmer of this purpose was evident at the begin-
ning. The 1958 National Defense Education Act, which created the ante-
cedent to the Perkins Program, included among its “findings and
declaration of policy” that, for national security reasons, “we must in-
crease our efforts to identify and educate more of the talent of our Na-
tion,” which in turn “requires programs that will give assurance that no
student of ability will be denied an opportunity for higher education be-
cause of financial need.”41 Although this provision mainly emphasized
strengthening national defense, one might find in the language of “oppor-
tunity” and “financial need” an embryonic commitment to equality of ed-
ucational opportunity.
With the HEA of 1965, providing educational opportunity regardless of
financial need moved from being a possible secondary purpose to the
likely primary purpose. In January 1965, when President Johnson intro-
duced the administration proposals that led to the HEA,42 he told Con-
gress, “I have proposed that we set full educational opportunity as our
first national goal. Every child must be encouraged to get as much educa-
tion as he has the ability to take. We want this for his sake, and we want
this for the country’s sake.”43
In hearings shortly thereafter on the bills embodying the administra-
tion’s proposals, Secretary Anthony Celebrezze of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) reminded the committee that
Congress “now has before it the education program proposed last month
by President Johnson,”44 reflecting Johnson’s proposal “that we give new
meaning to the phrase ‘equality of opportunity.’”45
Francis Keppel, the Commissioner of Education, occupied the top edu-
cation position within the then-existing HEW.46 Testifying in favor of the
administration’s proposal, he described the “general objectives and needs
that determined the ultimate design” as follows:
The first objective was expressed by the President when he proposed
that ‘we begin a program in education to insure every American
child the fullest development of his mind and skills’ . . . . It is now
time to take steps to insure that academically qualified students in all
economic circumstances have the means to finance their higher
education.47
41. National Defense Education Act, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 101, 72 Stat. 1580, 1581
(1958).
42. See Nat’l TRIO Clearinghouse, The Early History of the Higher Education Act of
1965, PELL INST. (Feb. 2003), http://www.pellinstitute.org/downloads/trio_clearinghouse-
The_Early_History_of_the_HEA_of_1965.pdf [https://perma.cc/7USH-ASRQ].
43. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks to Congress on Education (Jan. 12, 1965)
[hereinafter 1965 Remarks to Congress].
44. 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 26.
45. Id.
46. See Eloise Pasachoff, Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the
Reauthorization of Head Start: From Positional Conflict to Interest-Based Agreement, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 363–64 (2006).
47. 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 80.
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The emphasis was no longer so much on educated workers’ benefits to
society as on the opportunity that society was to provide individuals.
Congressional debates on the HEA reflect the same concern with
equal opportunity as the hearings. In introducing the bill that became the
HEA, Representative Adam Clayton Powell stated, “[W]e declare our
recognition that higher education is the keystone of our educational pro-
gram upon whose strength the success of our efforts to achieve full educa-
tional opportunity vitally depends.”48 Few went as far as Representative
Patsy Mink did when she declared a child’s “right” to education “regard-
less of his family circumstance,”49 but the record is full of references to
equality of educational opportunity, often with specific reference to
equality of opportunity regardless of economic circumstance.50
After the Higher Education Bill went to the Senate, the committee re-
port clarified the purpose of grant and loan assistance to college stu-
dents.51 It identified “keeping the college door open to all students of
ability”52 and “offer[ing] every child the fullest possible educational op-
portunity”53 as the key challenges the programs was to address.
Access to education regardless of finances continued to be a goal of
later student-loan laws, although the idea was mentioned less often. In-
troducing the proposal that became the Middle Income Student Assis-
tance Act (MISAA), President Carter asserted, “No one should be
denied the opportunity for a college education for financial reasons
alone.”54 In hearings on the bill, Subcommittee Chair Representative
William D. Ford stated that the goals of the legislation included “access to
education” and “complete freedom of choice.”55
Fifteen years later, legislators offered access as a justification for
OBRA’s introduction of widespread direct federal lending.56 Senator
Paul Simon predicted on the Senate floor that when direct lending was
“fully enacted, there will be hundreds of thousands of students . . . who
48. 111 CONG. REC. 21,880 (1965).
49. Id. at 21,898 (statement of Rep. Mink).
50. Perhaps the most ringing example comes from the statement of Representative
Tunney:
We are untrue to our democratic ideals if youths are barred from a college
education because of their economic status. The program of student assis-
tance contained in the Higher Education Act gives priority to closing the gap
which exists in equality of opportunity for attending college and attempts to
make higher education a possibility for all.
Id. at 21,908 (statement of Rep. Tunney). For further examples, see id. at 21,881 (statement
of Rep. Green); id. at 21,882 (statement of Rep. Green); id. at 21,883 (statement of Rep.
Quieat); id. at 21,892 (statements of Rep. Perkins and Rep. Reid); id. at 21,896 (statement
of Rep. Carey); id. at 21,899 (statement of Rep. Helstowski); id. at 21,900 (statement of
Rep. Boland); id. at 21,904 (statement of Rep. Fogarty); id. at 21,906 (statement of Rep.
Schisler); id. at 21,908 (statement of Rep. Cohelan); id. at 21,913 (statement of Rep. Dono-
hue); id. at 21,915 (statement of Rep. Roybal).
51. See generally S. REP. NO. 89-673 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4027.
52. Id. at 4055.
53. Id. at 4060.
54. 1978 MISAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 284.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 4001–4301, 107 Stat. 312, 340–78 (1993).
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can go to college and are not going now.”57 Senator Paul Wellstone stated
that direct lending “is going to mean that many more young and not so
young people are going to be able to pursue their higher education.”58
When Congress expanded income-driven repayment and created the
Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program in the College Cost Reduction
and Access Act of 2007,59 the debate reflected bipartisan support for ac-
cess regardless of income. Senator Mike Enzi, Republican of Wyoming,
stated, “Higher education is the onramp to success in the global economy,
and it is our responsibility to make sure everyone can access that oppor-
tunity and reach their goals.”60 According to Representative George
Miller, Democrat of California, the legislation “says to those individuals
who are fully qualified to go to college, we will not deny you access to the
college of your choice, to the education of your choice, . . . and to the
curriculum of your choice because you can’t afford to pay for it.”61
Members of Congress continued to express a concern for access in the
debate in 2010 over terminating the FFEL program and moving com-
pletely to direct lending. Given the subject matter, the main debating
points were the projected federal cost savings on one side62 and the perils
of “nationalizing the student loan industry” on the other.63 However,
Senator Barbara Mikulski, speaking about the broader purpose of the
student loan programs, extolled the value of access in terms that called to
mind Representative Mink’s declaration in 1965 of a right to education,
speaking of “an implicit freedom [the] Constitution doesn’t lay out in
writing[:] . . . the freedom to achieve.”64
Courts and scholars have recognized that providing equal access to
higher education is a central purpose of the student-loan programs. The
Ninth Circuit’s statement is typical: echoing the 1965 Senate committee
report, it found that the HEA was adopted “to keep the college door
open to all students of ability, regardless of background.”65 Professor
Glater may overstate the case for rhetorical effect when he writes, “The
goal of extending [student] loans is access, not repayment.”66 However,
57. 139 CONG. REC. 9,423 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Simon).
58. Id. at 9,500 (remarks of Sen. Wellstone).
59. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1099(e) (2012)).
60. 153 CONG. REC. 23,864 (2007) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
61. 153 CONG. REC. 18,538 (2007) (statement of Rep. Miller); see also id. at 18,522
(statement of Rep. Miller) (stating legislation is “about” making sure that the “doors [of
higher education institutions] will not be closed to people who are talented and ready to go
to college”).
62. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. 4,832 (2010) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (stating trans-
fer of lending authority to direct lending program “will save approximately $61 billion over
10 years”).
63. See, e.g., id. at 4,797 (statement of Sen. Gregg).
64. Id. at 4,858 (statement of Sen. Mikulski).
65. Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 938 (9th Cir. 2010); Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009); Pelfrey v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 71 F. Supp.
2d 1161, 1162–63 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
66. Jonathan D. Glater, The Narrative and Rhetoric of Student Loan Debt, 2018 UTAH
L. REV. 885, 891 (2018).
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Professor Glater’s basic point seems to command general acceptance.67
When members of Congress spoke specifically about the barriers to
access that the student-loan programs were to overcome, they apparently
mentioned economic barriers more often than those arising from race,
ethnicity, or gender. Professor Glater concluded that advancing civil
rights was not a primary goal of the HEA.68 However, there is evidence
of specific concern with race, ethnicity, and gender,69 including from
President Johnson himself.70 Moreover, the many general references in
the record to equality of opportunity also can be understood to encom-
pass them.71 Accordingly, this article notes instances where nondis-
chargeability’s burdens fall disproportionately on particular racial, ethnic,
and/or gender groups.
2. Educating the Population for the Benefit of the Country
Probably the oldest purpose of federal student-loan programs is to edu-
cate people so that they can use their education for the benefit of society
more broadly. The 1958 National Defense Education Act opened with
the finding that “the security of the Nation requires the fullest develop-
ment of the mental resources and technical skills of its young men and
women.”72 It defined the Act’s purpose as providing assistance to individ-
67. See Bruckner, supra note 9, at 249 (“One of the HEA’s primary goals is to increase
student access to post-secondary education.”); Robert C. Cloud & Richard Fossey, Facing
the Student-Debt Crisis: Restoring the Integrity of the Federal Student Loan Program, 40
J.C. & U.L 467, 495–96 (2014) (describing the original purpose of the federal student loan
program as “keeping the college door open to all students of ability, regardless of socioeco-
nomic background”); Mala Gusman Bridwell, Student Loan Bankruptcies, 1978 WASH. U.
L.Q. 593, 595–96 (1978) (stating the purpose of student loan programs is “to allow every
person the fullest possible educational opportunity by making loans available to those who
could not otherwise obtain a loan because of their age and lack of collateral borrowing
history”); Kevin J. Smith, Should the “Undue Hardship” Standard for Discharging Student
or Educational Loans Be Expanded?, 18 BARRY L. REV. 333, 335 (2011) (stating the pur-
pose of the HEA “was to ensure that all students wishing to attend college would be finan-
cially able to attend by providing financial assistance for education to students that had no
means to do so, other than grants”).
68. See Jonathan D. Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity, supra note 10, at 93 (stating that
members of Congress “understood the ambition [of the HEA] as limited and distinct from
the goals of legislation aimed explicitly at protecting civil rights”).
69. See 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 83 (statement of Comm’r Keppel) (not-
ing that for low-income families “[t]he situation for girls is even less equitable” than it is
for boys because fewer low-income girls from the top half of their classes went on to
college).
70. See The Fifth Freedom: The President’s Message to Congress on Education, 4
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 215, 219 (Feb. 5, 1968) (proposing Educational Opportunity
Act of 1968 “[t]o set a new and sweeping national goal: that in America there must be no
economic or racial barrier to higher education”).
71. See 111 CONG. REC. 21,876 (1965). See generally supra Part II.B.1. In addition,
Princeton President William Bowen’s testimony that “we have an interest as a society in
having an educational system that encompasses people from all kind of backgrounds,
hopeful always that they will learn from each other” may foreshadow modern appreciation
of diversity. See 1978 MISAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 16.
72. National Defense Education Act, Pub. L. No. 85-864, § 101, 72 Stat. 1580, 1581
(1958). The NDEA’s findings section goes on to state, “The defense of this Nation depends
upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex scientific principles. It
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uals and state and local governments “in order to insure trained man-
power [sic] of sufficient quality and quantity to meet the national defense
needs of the United States.”73
The legislative record of MISAA reflects not just the idea that educa-
tional opportunity is fair to individuals, but also that “we have an interest
as a society in having an educational system that encompasses people
from all kinds of backgrounds, hopeful always that they will learn from
each other,” as William Bowen, president of Princeton University and
board chair of the American Council on Education, testified.74
Proponents of the HEA of 1965 continued to emphasize education’s
benefits for the country. President Johnson emphasized that education
was not just for the child’s sake but “for the country’s sake.”75 As reasons
for Title IV, the Senate committee report identified the “continuing
shortage of trained, educated persons in many areas”76 and the “present
and future shortage of competent, well-trained professional and technical
personnel,”77 without indicating that the shortage affected only particular
subjects.
Administration officials supporting the HEA appealed to a “national
interest” in education. Testifying in favor of the initial bill that ultimately
evolved into the HEA of 1965, HEW Secretary Celebrezze stated of Title
IV, “It is in the national interest that more of the country’s young people
have the opportunity to acquire better training and education,”78 without
limiting the assertion to scientific, engineering, and language education.
Commissioner Keppel likewise testified in committee hearings on the
predecessor bill to the HEA that “the urgency” of the need for Title IV
“is compounded by the fact that our economic growth is seriously ham-
pered by a shortage of highly trained manpower”79 and that the fact that
people from lower-income families were less likely to go to college was,
“[i]n the light of our needs as a nation, [a] situation [that] represents seri-
ous loss.”80
In later debates over the bill, Representative Joseph Minish echoed the
administration officials’ points. He argued that “the dollars spent on op-
portunity grants and government loans to students can be justified if for
no other reason than on the grounds of a sound economic investment.”81
The idea that college-education payments are an investment that pays
off for society also shows up in the history of later statutes. In the House
depends as well upon the discovery and development of new principles, new techniques,
and new knowledge.” Id.
73. Id. at 1581–82.
74. 1978 MISAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 16.
75. See 1965 Remarks to Congress, supra note 43.
76. S. REP. NO. 89-673 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4027, 4053.
77. Id.
78. 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 28.
79. Id. at 80.
80. Id. at 83.
81. 111 CONG. REC. 21,912 (1965) (statement of Rep. Minish) (“Special skills and a
highly trained working force are of vital national concern.”).
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debate over the 2007 College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Represen-
tative Miller described the legislation as “investing in the students and the
talent of the future,” in “the young people that will take their talents and
provide the next generation of discovery, . . . innovation, . . . jobs . . . ,
[and] economic activity here at home . . . . [T]hat’s the investment we . . .
make in this generation of young people for the future of this country.”82
3. Enabling Free Choice of Career
Congress has designed the student-loan program with an eye toward
students’ freedom of choice of career. Recognizing that student loans are
to be repaid in most instances,83 members of Congress have acknowl-
edged and sought to mitigate the influence of high loan balances on ca-
reer choice. Particularly by providing income-driven repayment options
and public-service loan forgiveness, Congress has sought to structure stu-
dent-loan repayment so that borrowers will not feel constrained to take
higher-paying jobs to repay loans but, rather, will have the choice to pur-
sue valuable but lower-paying careers.
Congress first authorized income-driven repayment for a broad class of
student-loan borrowers in the OBRA of 1993.84 The Act made income-
contingent repayment (ICR), the first full-scale income-driven repayment
program, available to federal direct-loan borrowers.85 As noted else-
where, “The most frequently referenced goal for ICR was making it eas-
ier for graduates to pursue lower-paying but important vocations, such as
public-service careers.”86 The committee report on the house bill that led
to OBRA 1993 identified one of the purposes of the student-loan reform
as “provid[ing] [borrowers] a variety of repayment plans, including [a]n
income-contingent repayment [plan] . . . so that they have flexibility in
managing their student loan repayment obligations, and so that those ob-
ligations do not foreclose community service-oriented career choices for
[them].”87
The 2007 College Cost Reduction and Access Act made IDR more
generous88 and instituted public-service loan forgiveness (PSLF), which
provides for cancellation of federal student loans after ten years of pub-
82. 153 CONG. REC. 18,522 (2007).
83. See, e.g., 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 324 (statement of Rep. Green).
(describing NDSL program loans as entailing students’ “obligation . . . to repay . . . just the
same as their income tax or any other obligation they owe to the Federal Government”). In
this pre-nondischargeability statement, Representative Green did not address whether the
obligation to repay should extend to bankrupt borrowers.
84. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
85. See id. § 4021 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D) (2012)).
86. John Patrick Hunt, Help or Hardship?: Income-Driven Repayment in Student-Loan
Bankruptcies, 106 GEO. L.J. 1287, 1313–14 (2018).
87. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 119 (1993).
88. The 2007 Act provided for an IDR “program that capped payments at fifteen per-
cent of discretionary income instead of twenty percent, and that covered federally guaran-
teed private loans and not just federal direct loans.” Hunt, supra note 86, at 1316.
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lic-service employment.89 Enhancing students’ freedom to pursue lower-
paying careers was a central purpose of the Act. Early in the debates over
the bill, Representative Miller said that the legislation “says to those indi-
viduals who are fully qualified to go to college, we will not deny you ac-
cess . . . to the career of your choice . . . because you can’t afford to pay
for it.”90
The fullest explanation of the bill’s career-choice-enhancing purpose
came during the final Senate debate on it. There, Senator Patty Murray
identified a “problem with high student loan debt” in that it “limits the
career choices of college graduates.”91 Senator Russ Feingold likewise
observed, “It is unfortunate that so many students are forced to consider
their debt loads when deciding which jobs to take or pursue.”92 Senator
Richard Durbin told the story of a young teacher who “wanted to teach
in an inner-city school” but took a higher-paying job in the suburbs be-
cause “I have student loans, you know.”93
Senators did not just identify the burden on career choice as a problem;
they saw themselves as acting to deal with it. Senator Hillary Clinton pre-
dicted that PSLF would “provid[e] an incentive for college graduates to
pursue lower paying, but vital professions.”94 Senator Sherrod Brown
observed,
Two-thirds of Ohio students graduating are burdened with an aver-
age of $20,000 in student loan debt. That makes a big difference in
career choice. . . . This seems to be a generation of idealism, and
[with the legislation] we will see those students be able to pursue a
career in public service and be able to take those jobs, sometimes—
often—at lower pay, but be able to relieve themselves of the huge
burden of debt.95
To be sure, the statements just quoted appeared in the context of enact-
ing specific debt-relief programs, IDR and PSLF, with specific rules.
However, the expressions of concern are general in nature. They bespeak
the existence of a policy that informs the interpretation the entire statu-
89. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401, 121
Stat. 784 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087e (2012)) (adding public service loan
forgiveness to the HEA).
90. 153 CONG. REC. 18,538 (2007); see 2007 CCRAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 40
(statement of Rep. Petri) (“[IDR] would also give people the opportunity to do low-in-
come work to prepare for maybe more lucrative careers later.”).
91. 153 CONG. REC. 23,873 (2007).
92. Id. at 23,872.
93. Id. at 23,868.
94. Id. at 23,869; see id. at 23,880 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that a “moun-
tain of debt is distorting the basic life choices of countless Americans,” including by “dis-
couraging many young people from choosing . . . low-paying but vital jobs that bring large
benefits to society”).
95. Id. at 23,864–865 (Sept. 7, 2007); see id. at 23,878 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)
(stating that legislation would “help us take advantage of that idealism that is out there” by
addressing the current situation, that students “have to choose careers in order to deal with
the indebtedness”).
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tory scheme, including the undue-hardship provision.96
4. Providing a Benefit to Students
Perhaps implicit in the discussion above, but worthy of explicit men-
tion, is the notion that the purpose of student loans is to help borrowers,
not harm them. As President Johnson stated in kicking off the process
that led to the HEA, encouraging “[e]very child . . . to get as much educa-
tion as he has the ability to take” is “for his sake,” as well as “the coun-
try’s sake.”97 Secretary Celebrezze testified that Title IV was designed
“to make the benefits of higher education available” more broadly.98
In the hearings leading up to the HEA, Commissioner Keppel called
upon Congress to “insure every American child the fullest development
of his mind and skills.”99 Representative Jeffery Cohelan stated that a
goal of the HEA was “an educational system that allows each and every
American to pursue his schooling to the fullest extent of his capabili-
ties.”100 None of the many references to equality of educational opportu-
nity quoted above refer to equality of opportunity to take risks, as
opposed to equality of opportunity to receive a benefit.101
And the emphasis on helping borrowers continued as the student loan
program evolved. In 1993, Senator Simon predicted on the Senate floor
that when direct lending was “fully enacted, there will be hundreds of
thousands of students who will be able to be helped, who can go to col-
lege and are not going now.”102 Later, in 2007, Senator Enzi described
higher education as “the onramp to success in the global economy,”103
and in 2010, Senator Mikulski spoke of “the freedom to achieve” through
higher education.104 Members of Congress stressed the upside for stu-
dents of debt-financed education without mentioning its potential
downside.
It might be argued that Congress intended to help borrowers by financ-
ing education but intended to subject borrowers to an obligation to repay
that could not be escaped, even if the borrower would have been better
off never borrowing the funds in the first place—that is, even if the loans
turned out to be harmful. In this view, taking out federally supported
student loans is comparable to investing in stock market index funds105 or
96. See discussion infra Part VI.A (discussing interpretation of “undue hardship” in
light of the overall purposes of the student-loan statutes).
97. See 1965 Remarks to Congress, supra note 43.
98. 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 29.
99. Id. at 80.
100. 111 CONG. REC. 21,908 (1965).
101. See supra note 50. See generally supra Part II.B.1.
102. 139 CONG. REC. 9423 (1993).
103. 153 CONG. REC. 23,864 (2007).
104. 156 CONG. REC. 4,858 (2010).
105. See, e.g., James Chen, Introduction to Investing: A Beginner’s Guide to Asset Clas-
ses, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/basics/11/3-s-simple-investing
.asp [https://perma.cc/9B76-NT5U] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (“[M]ost people are too busy
to worry about monitoring their portfolios on a daily basis. Therefore, sticking with index
funds that mirror the market is a viable solution.”).
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perhaps splitting aces or eights as a blackjack player106—a usually advan-
tageous but risky bet, one to be undertaken only with the expectation
that one may very well lose one’s stake and end up worse off because of
the venture. Some courts have adopted this view, emphasizing a distinc-
tion between a purpose to promote education and one to “insure the fu-
ture success” of individual students.107
But the language quoted above is that of aid, not of risk. In the legisla-
tive history the author has reviewed,108 the overall gist was not, “We are
going to help students by enabling them to make a risky bet that may
leave them worse off.”109 Instead, members of Congress, as well as hear-
ing witnesses, including administration officials, treated student loans as
straightforward vehicles for aid to students.
To be sure, Congress expected that student loans generally would be
repaid110 and has not been blind to the risk of nonpayment. But the legis-
lative history reveals no expression of intention that loans be an instru-
ment of harm to even a minority of borrowers. Instead, the leading
themes are: (1) students who can repay their student loans without hard-
ship but “feel like they can get away with” not doing so are worthy of
opprobrium;111 (2) loan programs should be administered efficiently to
promote repayment, for example by keeping track of borrowers’ loca-
tions;112 and (3) a basic feature and function of the government student-
loan programs is to assume the risk that borrowers would ultimately be
106. See, e.g., When to Split Aces and Eights in Blackjack, COUNTING EDGE, https://
www.countingedge.com/splitting-aces-eights/ [https://perma.cc/D7WV-WQN4] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2019) (“Basic strategy states that you should always split aces and eights.”).
107. See In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993). But see Krieger v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2013) (“It is important not to allow judicial
glosses, such as the language in Roberson and Brunner, to supersede the words of the
statute itself.”).
108. See supra note 32.
109. But see 111 CONG. REC. 21,933 (1965) (statement of Rep. Brademas) (arguing that
education grants are justified because “able students from exceptionally needy families,
particularly girls” are “unable to accept the risk and burden of substantial debt in order to
continue their education”).
110. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
111. 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 701 (statement of Rep. Gibbons). This senti-
ment underlays the limitation on discharging student loans in bankruptcy. See Hunt, supra
note 86, at 1302–07.
112. See 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 333 (statement of Rep. Brademas and
William R. Patterson, Assistant to the Treasurer, Georgetown University).
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unable to pay,113 a risk that would make private lenders unable to offer
acceptable terms.114
Thus, Congress’s overall purpose has been for student loans to help
students and there seems to be no clear statement that the risks of failed
investments in education were to fall on the borrowers. These observa-
tions round out our understanding of the undue-hardship standard for
student-loan bankruptcies. They provide a fuller picture of Congress’s
relevant purposes than the picture that emerges from examining the
nondischargeability provision in isolation, as courts typically have
done.115 And they complement the well-documented finding that the pri-
mary targets of nondischargeability were debtors who had benefited from
their student loans and could repay them without hardship but chose not
to do so.116
III. NONDISCHARGEABILITY THWARTS FOUR
STUDENT-LOAN PROGRAM PURPOSES
Student loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless the debtor
commences a special proceeding against the student-loan creditor within
the bankruptcy117 and shows that repayment would be an “undue hard-
ship.”118 Courts in most jurisdictions119 evaluate undue hardship using
the Brunner test, which requires the debtor to show that the debtor can-
not maintain a minimal standard of living while repaying the loans, that
“additional circumstances” indicate that this condition is likely to persist
for a significant portion of the repayment period, and that the debtor has
made a good faith effort to repay.120 The requirement to show undue
113. For statements acknowledging the possibility that students might not be able to
repay loans, see 1993 OBRA Hearings, supra note 32, at 47 (statement of Sen.
Durenberger) (“It seems to me that the Government has no business loaning money out
on the basis of potential earnings without either accepting a greater risk at the repayment
end or providing repayment choices which help students through life’s problems.”); id. at
139 (statement of John Schullo, Director of Financial Aid, Bemidji State University); 1978
MISAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 220–21 (statement of Rep. Erlenborn); 1965 HEA
Hearings, supra note 32, at 425–26 (statement of Peter P. Muirhead, Associate Comm’r for
Higher Education, U.S. Office of Education) (stating that the problem of collection of
NDSL loans arises from fact that borrowers’ “future income cannot . . . be forecast with
confidence”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-951, at 21 (discussing possibility that lenders in GSL pro-
gram would lend to “lower risk-higher income” students); S. REP. NO. 95-643, at 12 (same).
114. 1965 HEA Hearings, supra note 32, at 338 (statement of William R. Patterson,
Assistant to the Treasurer, Georgetown University) (stating federal loan program gives
loans on basis of need where commercial lender would not because of lack of assurance of
ability to repay).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
116. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1302–07.
117. Specifically, the debtor must commence an “adversary proceeding.” See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 7001(6) (including the following as an advisory proceeding: “a proceeding to
determine the dischargeability of a debt”).
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) (providing that student loans are nondischarge-
able absent a showing of undue hardship).
119. See supra note 1 (indicating nine federal judicial circuits have adopted the Brunner
test).
120. See Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam).
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hardship, which does not apply to any other type of debt, is probably
responsible for the fact that only around 0.1%–0.2% of bankrupt student-
loan debtors succeed in discharging their student loans.121 For economy,
this article refers to the just-described conditional nondischargeability of
student loans simply as “nondischargeability.”
This part explains how nondischargeability probably interferes with ac-
complishing the student-loan program purposes that Part II described.
Part III argues that nondischargeability, at least in some cases, probably
deters students from commencing and completing education, distorts
both students’ courses of study and their choice of jobs, discourages bor-
rowers from economic and social activity, and harms borrowers. The ar-
gument draws both on empirical social-science literature and on factual
propositions that are broadly accepted as underpinnings of bankruptcy
law.
Empirical scholars have studied nondischargeability in particular much
less than they have studied debt in general. Thus, most of the negative
effects described in Part III have been shown more directly for indebted-
ness in general than for nondischargeability in particular, and more re-
search on nondischargeability specifically is certainly desirable. However,
given that nondischargeability perpetuates indebtedness, the circumstan-
tial case against nondischargeability is strong.
A. DETERRENCE OF EDUCATION
Increased student debt and increased enrollment in higher education
have gone together.122 Nevertheless, fear of debt apparently keeps at
least some prospective students from starting higher education and keeps
others from finishing. Nondischargeability probably contributes to this
“debt deterrence,” thereby interfering with accomplishment of the pur-
poses of the student-loan programs.
1. Enrollment
The empirical literature on debt deterrence is still developing, but con-
siderable evidence exists that debt deterrence is real. For example, the
authors of a recent study of 265,000 student debtors report that their ap-
proach “strongly support[s] a causal interpretation” of the association
they found between having high undergraduate debt and not attending
graduate school.123
Other work focuses on underlying psychological causes of debt deter-
rence. A substantial body of scholarship examines “debt aversion” (also
called “loan aversion”) which has been defined as the unwillingness to
121. See Hunt, supra note 38.
122. See, e.g., Rachel E. Dwyer et al., Debt and Graduation from American Universities,
90 SOC. FORCES 1133, 1136 (2012) (collecting studies).
123. Vyaceslav Fos et al., Debt and Human Capital: Evidence from Student Loans 3, 9
(Apr. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2901631 [https://perma.cc/37S9-X85G].
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take out student loans even when doing so probably would be a good idea
given the benefits of higher education.124 Several studies find that 20% to
50% of potential student borrowers are debt-averse.125 Researchers have
reported that low-income,126 LatinX,127 and possibly Asian-American
students128 are more likely to be debt-averse.
Debt aversion is an attitude and, therefore, is not identical to debt de-
terrence. Someone might express debt-averse attitudes but borrow for
school anyway. However, studies indicate that the eminently plausible
link between debt aversion and debt deterrence actually exists: prospec-
124. See Angela Boatman et al., Understanding Loan Aversion in Education: Evidence
from High School Seniors, Community College Students, and Adults, AM. EDUC. RES.
ASS’N OPEN, Jan.–Mar. 2017, at 1 (defining loan aversion as “an unwillingness to take a
loan to pay for college, even when that loan would likely offer a positive long-term re-
turn.”). Debt (or loan) aversion has also been defined as simple unwillingness to take out
student loans. See Angela Boatman & Brent J. Evans, How Financial Literacy, Federal Aid
Knowledge, and Credit Market Experience Predict Loan Aversion for Education, 671 AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 49, 53 (2017) (measuring loan aversion through answer
to survey question, “Do you think it is ok to borrow for education?”).
125. See BORIS PALAMETA & JEAN-PIERRE VOYER, WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR POST-
SECONDARY EDUCATION AMONG UNDER-REPRESENTED GROUPS 51 (2010) (stating that
of Canadian students in final year of high school or first year of college surveyed in
2008–2009, between 5% and 20% were debt-averse); Boatman et al., supra note 124, at 1
(reporting survey finding that 20% to 40% of high school seniors were debt-averse); Mo
Xue & Xia Chao, Non-Borrowing Students’ Perceptions of Student Loans and Strategies of
Paying for College, 45 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 25, 28, 30 (2015) (finding in interviews that
thirteen of thirty non-borrowing students from lower- or lower-middle-class backgrounds
stated they would be unwilling to take education loans); Sara Goldrick-Rab & Robert
Kelchen, Making Sense of Loan Aversion: Evidence from Wisconsin, in STUDENT LOANS
AND THE DYNAMICS OF DEBT 317, 333–34, 346 (Brad Hershbein & Kevin Hollenbeck eds.,
2015) (finding that 48% of sample of Wisconsin Pell Grant recipients surveyed in 2008
were debt-averse); see also PAMELA BURDMAN, THE STUDENT DEBT DILEMMA: DEBT
AVERSION AS A BARRIER TO COLLEGE ACCESS 6–8 (2005) (providing anecdotal examples
of debt aversion).
126. See THOMAS G. MORTENSON, ACT PROGRAM, ATTITUDES OF AMERICANS TO-
WARD BORROWING TO FINANCE EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES 1959–1983, at 13, 21 (1988)
(finding that “[t]he group that thinks least favorably toward loans is the lowest income
population” based on analysis of survey data collected by the Fed from 1959–1983); Claire
Callender & Geoff Mason, Does Student Loan Debt Deter Higher Education Participation?
New Evidence from England, 671 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 20, 20 (2017)
(concluding, based on nationally representative surveys of students in England who were
studying toward higher education entry-level qualifications or vocational qualifications,
that “[d]ebt-averse attitudes remain much stronger among lower-class students than among
upper-class students.”); Claire Callender & Jonathan Jackson, Does the Fear of Debt Deter
Students from Higher Education?, 34 J. SOC. POL’Y 509, 509 (2005) (concluding based on
survey of just under 2,000 prospective students in England that “those from low social
classes are more debt averse than those from other social classes”).
127. See ALISA F. CUNNINGHAM & DEBORAH A. SANTIAGO, INST. FOR HIGHER EDUC.
POL’Y & EXCELENCIA IN EDUC., STUDENT AVERSION TO BORROWING: WHO BORROWS
AND WHO DOESN’T? 18 (2008) (reporting LatinX students have lower-than-average rates
of borrowing); MORTENSON, supra note 126, at 21 (reporting that LatinX people have less
favorable views of student loans than African-American or white people); PALAMETA &
VOYER, supra note 125, at 51 (finding in Canadian study that Aboriginals, boys, and stu-
dents without college-educated parents were more likely to be loan-averse); Boatman et
al., supra note 124, at 1 (reporting that surveyed men and LatinX people were more likely
to be loan-averse than women and white respondents).
128. See CUNNINGHAM & SANTIAGO, supra note 127, at 18 (reporting that Asian-Amer-
ican students have lower-than-average rates of borrowing and reporting debt-averse atti-
tudes expressed in focus groups).
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tive students with debt-averse attitudes are in fact less likely to plan on
higher education.129 Among students of lower social class (to use the
study authors’ term),130 the effect is particularly strong.131
Findings such as those just described suggest that unease about debt
deterrence is justified, and in fact, anxiety about the issue is widespread.
No less a figure than the president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia expressed apprehension in a speech last year, declaring,
“I am concerned that the looming shadow of student debt, coupled with
increasing uncertainty about loan forgiveness programs and income-
driven repayment, may dissuade some potential students—particularly
those from low- and middle-income families—from going to college or
pursuing jobs in public service.”132
Debt deterrence seems, perhaps unsurprisingly, to be of particular con-
cern to the medical profession.133 The American Medical Association, for
example, has stated that the high debt burden of medical school “may
dissuade students from attending medical school altogether, especially
students from diverse ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds.”134 Public-
health researchers working on medical education have expressed similar
views.135
129. See Callender & Jackson, supra note 126, at 524 (“[O]n average, debt aversion was
a deterrent to applying to university.”); Callender & Mason, supra note 126, at 36, 46 n.16
(explaining that loan-averse attitudes “are negatively related to planned [higher education]
participation,” using both 2002 and 2015 data, and stating that the 2002 association is sig-
nificant when applying the model of the 2017 paper to the 2002 sample of students used in
the 2005 paper).
130. These studies measure social class by occupation and economic activity of the
household’s primary earner. See Callender & Jackson, supra note 126, at 519–20; Callender
& Mason, supra note 126, at 30.
131. See Callender & Jackson, supra note 126, at 509 (“Those from low social classes
are . . . far more likely to be deterred from going to university because of their fear of
debt.”); Callender & Mason, supra note 126, at 41 (“Lower-class students are still far more
likely than students from other social classes to be deterred from planning to enter [higher
education] because of fear of debt. . . . Debt aversion seems more likely to deter antici-
pated [higher education] participation among lower-class students in 2015 than in 2002.”).
But see Mauricio Olavarrı´a Gambi & Claudio Allende Gonza´lez, Endeudamiento Estudi-
antil y Acceso a la Educacio´n Superior en Chile [Student Debt and Access to Higher Educa-
tion in Chile], 141 REVISTA ESPAN˜OLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLO´GICAS 91, 91 (2013)
(“[F]ear of indebtedness for post-secondary studies is not a limiting factor for young peo-
ple from lower-income sectors to go on to tertiary education.”).
132. See Patrick T. Harker, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Phila., The Economics of Equitable Education: How Today’s Loans, Access, and Training
Affect Tomorrow’s Economy 8 (Apr. 17, 2018), available at https://www.philadelphiafed
.org/-/media/publications/speeches/harker/2018/04-17-18-saint-josephs-university.pdf?la=en
[HTTPS://PERMA.CC/5NPA-E9NZ].
133. See, e.g., Rick Seltzer, Antidote to Med Student Debt, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Aug. 17,
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/08/17/nyu-scholarships-cover-medical-
school-tuition-doctors-debt-continues-raise-concern [https://perma.cc/D2FA-F9FD] (“High
costs have for years stoked concerns about how debt affects aspiring doctors. Leaders
worry some of the best and the brightest students, particularly those from poor and immi-
grant communities, are dissuaded from attending medical school at all.”).
134. AM. MED. ASS’N, REDUCING MEDICAL STUDENT DEBT STRENGTHENS THE PHYSI-
CIAN WORKFORCE (2015).
135. Robert A. Dugger et al., The Color of Debt: Racial Disparities in Anticipated Medi-
cal Student Debt in the United States, 9 PLOS ONE e74693, Sept. 3, 2013, at 1, 5 (reporting
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Worries about debt deterrence are not limited to the United States.
Debt deterrence has been reported in Japan,136 and belief in the phenom-
enon has inspired the University of Cambridge to consider offering fully
funded, “debt-free” studentships.137
The empirical research in this area has focused so far on debt in general
rather than nondischargeability in particular, and nondischargeability-
specific research would be desirable. Nevertheless, scholars have posited
that nondischargeability deters attendance,138 and the circumstantial case
to that effect is strong. Certainly, it seems likely that nondischargeability
deters education that must be debt-financed, because it puts the borrower
in a worse position if the investment does not pan out. Nondis-
chargeability hinders, and may altogether prevent, escape via bankruptcy.
Although it might be argued that potential student borrowers are una-
ware of or unconcerned with the nuances of bankruptcy law, student-loan
nondischargeability is firmly in the popular domain. Media accounts fre-
quently state (incorrectly) that student-loan debt is always nondischarge-
able.139 Internet commentators cite nondischargeability as a reason not to
pursue higher education, even if such arguments sometimes are made
without great legal precision.140
on study finding that African-American medical students anticipate higher education debt
than other groups: “It is plausible that this disproportionate debt burden may play a role in
the decline in medical school attendance among Black students.”).
136. See Yoshiaki Nohara, Japan’s Students Face Uncertain Future Under Cloud of
Debt, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/12/29/national/
social-issues/japans-students-face-uncertain-future-cloud-debt [https://perma.cc/7BL7-
CDGM] (“[T]he rise of college loans . . . dissuades poorer students, who worry that they
won’t get the jobs needed to be able to repay the loan.”).
137. Louis Ashworth & Rosie Bradbury, Cambridge Considers Funding Debt-Free Edu-
cation for its Poorest Students, VARSITY (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.varsity.co.uk/news/
16010 [https://perma.cc/N6M8-CQJ9] (reporting that consideration of such studentships is
“part of an extensive access initiative set to launch in the coming year”).
138. See Atkinson, supra note 7, at 12 (“For potential borrowers, this burden [(i.e., the
burden of debt that may be nondischargeable)] may deter members of this group from
seeking an education if, in so doing, they must make themselves more vulnerable finan-
cially.”); id. at 25 (stating that nondischargeability “might also affect educational and ca-
reer choices”).
139. See Robert Farrington, The 2020 Presidential Candidates’ Proposals for Student
Loan Debt, FORBES (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2019/04/
24/the-2020-presidential-candidates-proposals-for-student-loan-debt/#753776c8520e
[https://perma.cc/ESS9-2HQ8] (stating that the 2005 bankruptcy bill made it “impossible to
discharge private student loan debt in bankruptcy”); Theodoric Meyer, Inside Biden and
Warren’s Yearslong Feud, POLITICO (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2019/03/12/biden-vs-warren-2020-democratic-primaries-bankruptcy-bill-225728
[https://perma.cc/P5QG-BZZD] (noting that the 2005 bankruptcy bill contained a provi-
sion to “bar those who file for bankruptcy from getting rid of private student loan debt”);
Andrew Ross Sorkin, No Tuition, But You Pay a Percentage of Your Income (If You Find
a Job), N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/business/dealbook/
education-student-loans-lambda-schools.html [https://perma.cc/8WW9-NVA8] (noting that
student loans borrowers “can’t escape [their loans] even by filing for bankruptcy”).
140. See, e.g., Casey Bond, Why College Isn’t Worth the Money, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/caseybond/2015/09/04/why-college-isnt-worth-the-money/#25
45dd53653d [https://perma.cc/K92N-UAU3] (“It should be noted that student loan debt is
the only type of debt that can’t be discharged through bankruptcy.”); Michael Price, 7
Reasons Why You Shouldn’t Go to College and 4 Things To Do Instead, HUFFINGTON POST
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In a similar vein, it is not always relevant (or accurate) to observe that
“high-school seniors aren’t thinking about bankruptcy.”141 As of fall
2017, 26.5% of American higher-education students were twenty-five or
older, and 16.2% were thirty or older.142 Moreover, high schoolers may
be more financially savvy about student loans, and may act more on such
knowledge, than is commonly appreciated. Data from a 2015 multi-state
survey indicates that approximately 40% of high-school students are
aware of income-driven repayment programs143 and that awareness of
such programs is associated with approximately an eight-point reduction
in debt aversion,144 relative to an overall debt-aversion rate of 21%.145
If potential students who are deterred are more likely to be from disad-
vantaged backgrounds, as seems to be the case, nondischargeability inter-
feres with equal access. And potential students who are deterred from
higher education do not contribute to an educated population or enjoy
freedom of career choice. Thus, nondischargeability-fueled debt deter-
rence would interfere with accomplishing the goals of the student-loan
programs.
2. Completion
Borrowing, at least beyond a certain point, appears to interfere with
the borrower’s completing an education program. A study of a 2007 sam-
ple of people aged twenty-five and above who were formerly students at
four-year colleges146 found that for public-university students, increases
in debt load beyond $10,000 reduced the probability of having gradu-
ated.147 The decrease was especially pronounced for students whose par-
ents’ income was in the bottom 75% of the distribution.148 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, given that many students cannot pay for higher education
without debt, those who borrowed some but less than $10,000 were more
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/7-reasons-why-you-shouldn_1_b_5501111
[https://perma.cc/3LGY-H73X] (“As a result of the scheme Wall Street, the Federal Gov-
ernment, and the college system concocted, America now holds $1 Trillion in student loan
debt. . . . The Federal Government loves this by the way, because student loans are the
only debt that can’t be expunged in bankruptcy proceedings.”). Bond’s and Price’s state-
ments are incorrect. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (listing types of nondischargeable debt
other than student loans, such as domestic support obligations).
141. See Boatman & Evans, supra note 124, at 8–10.
142. See THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2017, at 411 tbl.303.50 (2017).
143. See Boatman & Evans, supra note 124, at 58.
144. Id. at 60.
145. Id. at 59. In this study, loan aversion is defined as not answering “yes” to the
survey question, “Do you think it is ok to borrow for education?” Id. at 53.
146. See Dwyer et al., supra note 122, at 1140 (describing sample). The sample was
made up of students who were no longer attending college; that is, students who had grad-
uated or dropped out. Id.
147. See id. at 1146 fig.2. For private-university students, defined as those who had ever
attended a private university, id. at 1141, increasing debt was associated with an increasing
probability of having graduated at all levels of debt. Id. at 1145 fig.1. For the sample of all
students (that is, public and private university students combined), graduation rates did
start to decrease as debt climbed past approximately $12,000. See id.
148. See id. at 1149 fig.3.
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likely to have graduated than those who did not borrow at all.149
A study of 2,475 students at a large public university in the Midwest in
2014 to 2015150 reached a similar conclusion. The researchers found that
students who discontinued their education “had taken out $2,000–$3,000
more in loans in their first two years of college.”151
Empirical studies provide evidence that excessive debt interferes in
general with completion of studies. Bankruptcy cases, by contrast, pro-
vide specific examples. Kent Alan Holtorf’s story is one such example.
Holtorf completed medical school and started a residency in anesthesiol-
ogy.152 According to the bankruptcy court’s findings of uncontested facts,
Holtorf “became depressed over his perceptions of his prospects for em-
ployment and for repaying his educational loans,” began abusing sub-
stances, and dropped out of his residency program.153 Unmanageability,
real or perceived, of educational debt apparently contributed to Holtorf’s
failure to complete his education.154
A purely rational economic actor might decide to discontinue an edu-
cational program and stop borrowing if it becomes apparent that the in-
creased difficulty of handling the debt needed to complete the program
outweighs the net benefits of completion. Such a rational actor would not
have begun the program in the first place without believing at that time
that its benefits outweighed its costs, but changes in the calculus could
come in various ways. Such a student may at first have had earnings ex-
pectations that later came to seem too optimistic or may initially have
underestimated either the amount of borrowing needed or the difficulty
of repayment.155
Apart from a hypothetical rational actor’s analysis of marginal costs
and benefits, unmanageable debt can be discouraging156 and depress-
ing,157 leading a student to drop out, even if the existing debt is a sunk
cost. Holtorf’s case might well illustrate this scenario.
Whatever the pathway by which excessive debt leads to dropping out, it
seems likely that nondischargeability makes matters worse. Nondis-
chargeability makes future debts more threatening, and thus less attrac-
149. See id. at 1145 fig.1 (all students combined); id. at 1146 fig.2 (public and private
universities separately). For an additional study suggesting that debt interferes with com-
pletion, see, e.g., Lyle McKinney & Andrea Backschneider Burridge, Helping or Hinder-
ing? The Effects of Loans on Community College Student Persistence, 56 RES. HIGHER
EDUC. 299, 314 (2015) (noting that based on Fall 2003 data, community college students
who borrowed federal loans in their first year were more likely to drop out).
150. Sonya L. Britt et al., Student Loans, Financial Stress, and College Student Reten-
tion, 47 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 25, 28 (2017).
151. Id. at 32.
152. Holtorf v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n (In re Holtorf), 204 B.R. 567, 568
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 571–72. The bankruptcy court denied discharge, finding that Holtorf did not
work enough hours per week and had made insufficient efforts to get work that would use
the medical education he did have. Id.
155. See Dwyer et al., supra note 122, at 1137.
156. See discussion infra Part III.C.
157. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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tive, and makes existing debts less manageable, and therefore more
discouraging.
When nondischargeability contributes to a student’s dropping out, the
purposes of the student-loan programs are frustrated for the same rea-
sons that they are frustrated when a student does not enroll in the first
place: the disparate impact on disadvantaged groups means access is une-
qual, and the dropouts do not become (completely) educated and cannot
pursue the careers they had planned. In addition, as Professor (and Rep-
resentative) Katherine Porter has found, when a student has taken out
loans and does not finish the program, it is more likely that borrowing
will have harmed rather than benefited the student.158
B. DISTORTION OF CAREERS
As discussed,159 Congress designed the student-loan programs to mini-
mize the debt-induced pressure on borrowers to seek lucrative careers at
the expense of worthwhile but lower-paying ones.160 Part III.B discusses
the empirical evidence that debt in fact distorts career choices and argues
that nondischargeability probably contributes to the distortion. One way
in which nondischargeability plays a direct role is that bankruptcy courts
often deny discharge based on the thesis that debtors should change jobs
and earn more money, even for debtors working in fields for which their
education has prepared them.
Nondischargeability may distort career choice by inducing the bor-
rower to seek a higher-paying job in a field for which the borrower’s edu-
cation is relevant. It may also, interfering more seriously with the goals of
the student-loan programs, cause the borrower to seek a job entirely
outside the scope of the borrower’s education. Part III.B discusses each
possibility in turn.
1. Distortion to a Within-Field Job
The pressure of nondischargeability could influence a student to pursue
a more lucrative career within the field for which they trained than they
otherwise would.161 Two examples are becoming a corporate tax lawyer
rather than a public interest lawyer or becoming a radiologist rather than
a general practitioner.162 In such cases, nondischargeability would distort
158. See Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of Dropping Out, in
BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 85, 92 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012)
(describing poorer economic outcomes for dropouts).
159. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
160. Although Congress was concerned that indebted borrowers might pursue money
to the exclusion of other goods, it is in fact far from clear that debt is on average associated
with higher earnings. See discussion infra Part III.D. Moreover, a major underpinning of
American bankruptcy law is that excessive indebtedness reduces economic activity. Part
III.C discusses this issue in detail.
161. Debt may also induce borrowers to choose career paths that maximize immediate
pay at the expense of long-term prospects. See Alexandra Minicozzi, The Short Term Effect
of Educational Debt on Job Decisions, 24 ECON. EDUC. REV. 417, 418–19 (2005).
162. Id.
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the student’s career choice, contrary to Congress’s purpose in creating the
student-loan programs. It is important that the point here is not that stu-
dents should not seek high-paying jobs if that is what they want. Instead,
it is that Congress wanted to minimize the extent to which debt financing
forces borrowers to seek such employment.
The evidence indicates that debt in fact distorts job selection. Re-
searchers examined the career choices of graduates of a particular selec-
tive college who entered from 1995 to 2002.163 This time frame
encompassed the period in which the college changed its financial aid
policies to replace loans with grants—first in part, then completely.164
The researchers concluded that “debt causes graduates to choose substan-
tially higher-salary jobs and reduces the probability that students choose
low-paid ‘public interest’ jobs.”165
Another study, conducted at the New York University School of Law,
indicates that even calling a financial aid package a loan, as opposed to a
grant, deters the recipient from choosing a public interest job. In this ex-
periment, some randomly selected admitted students were given a “loan”
that would be forgiven if they worked in low-paying public interest jobs,
while others were given an economically equivalent “tuition waiver” that
they would have to repay if they did not work in such jobs.166 In other
words, the packages were identical in substance, but one was called a
“loan” and the other was called a “tuition waiver.” The “tuition assis-
tance” recipients had a 36% to 45% higher rate of placement in eligible
jobs—that is to say, lower-paying public interest jobs.167 The study author
interpreted the results as “provid[ing] strong evidence of the influence of
debt burden on job choice in a real world setting.”168
The search of some indebted students for higher starting salaries may
come at the cost not just of public service, but also of the student’s own
long-term career prospects. Based on a 1987 survey of men who received
guaranteed student loans between 1976 and 1985 and who left school in
1983 or before,169 one researcher found that students with more educa-
tion debt had higher initial salaries but lower salary growth for the first
four years after leaving school.170
Debt’s distorting effects apparently start before graduation. Research-
ers who studied surveys of medical students from 1993 to 2010 found that
students with more debt were more likely to switch in medical school
163. Jesse Rothstein & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Constrained After College: Student Loans
and Early-Career Occupational Choices, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 149, 154 (2011).
164. Id. at 151–52.
165. Id. at 149. The authors gathered the data for this paper before Congress adopted
the most broadly available and extensive public-service loan forgiveness program in 2007.
166. See Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career Choice: Evidence from a
Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School, 2009 AM. ECON. J. 1, 1 (2006).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 19.
169. See Minicozzi, supra note 161, at 420–21.
170. Id. at 417.
2019] Tempering Bankruptcy Nondischargeability 751
from primary care to high-paying non-primary care specialties.171
As is the case for deterrence of education, discussed above, the empiri-
cal research here has focused on the effects of debt generally rather than
nondischargeability specifically. But again, it stands to reason that
nondischargeability would play a role: choosing to accept lower pay while
indebted generally entails assuming a financial risk, and the risk is less
attractive if bankruptcy provides no potential escape.
Moreover, there is direct evidence from the courts that nondis-
chargeability goads some borrowers to veer from the career path they
sought to follow by pursuing higher education. Courts have denied dis-
charge of student-loan debt based on the belief that the debtor should try
to get a higher-paying job, even when the debtor is working in the field
for which the debt-financed education has prepared the debtor.
Oyler v. Education Credit Management Corp. (In re Oyler)172 is an ex-
ample. In Oyler, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
Michael Oyler, the pastor of a start-up church, could not discharge his
student loans despite his income of less than $10,000 per year, earned
while apparently working sixty to seventy hours a week.173 The court
found that “[b]y education and experience he qualifies for higher-paying
work and is obliged to seek work that would allow debt repayment before
he can claim undue hardship.”174 It so held even though Oyler was work-
ing in ministry and had taken out the loans for training in that very
field.175 Courts outside the Sixth Circuit have followed the career-dis-
torting reasoning of Oyler.176
Beyond inferences about the effects of nondischargeability that can be
drawn from studies of debt, cases like Oyler send an unmistakable signal
that paying debts comes first and using one’s education to pursue one’s
career as one chooses comes second. They illustrate a clear conflict be-
tween nondischargeability and the career-choice purpose of the student-
loan programs.
2. Distortion to an Out-of-Field Job
The message of Oyler may just have been that the debtor needed to
find a higher-paying job within the fields for which he had been
171. See Martha S. Grayson et al., Payback Time: The Associations of Debt and Income
with Medical Student Career Choice, 46 MED. EDUC. 983, 983 (2012).
172. 397 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2005).
173. See Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 300 B.R. 255, 257, 260–61
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 397 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2005).
174. Oyler, 397 F.3d at 386.
175. See Oyler, 300 B.R. at 258–59 (recounting that Oyler had taken out his student
loans to finance his studies for the ministry and that the fact that the government guaran-
teed loans to study for work in such low-paying fields influenced the bankruptcy judge to
grant a discharge).
176. See Kehler v. Nelnet Loan Servs. (In re Kehler), 326 B.R. 142, 148 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 2005) (denying discharge to minister who took lower-paying job to be near and care
for aging parents: “He has not attempted to maximize his income by finding the better-
paying work for which he is qualified.”).
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trained.177 Courts sometimes go further and explicitly tell debtors to look
outside the scope of their training for higher-paying employment. In such
cases, nondischargeability’s harm to the purposes of the student-loan pro-
grams is particularly grave because society loses the benefit of the
debtor’s education if the debtor does what the court instructs.
United States Department of Education v. Gerhardt (In re Gerhardt)178
is an example. Jonathon Gerhardt was a professional cellist who was una-
ble to maintain a minimal standard of living on his cellist’s salary.179 The
court denied discharge, finding that “nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
suggests that a debtor may choose to work only in the field in which he
was trained, obtain a low-paying job, and then claim that it would be an
undue hardship to repay his student loans.”180
Other decisions have adopted Gerhardt’s reasoning. An example is
Matthews-Hamad v. Educational Credit Management Corp. (In re Mat-
thews-Hamad),181 mentioned in the introduction. In that case, the debtor,
Cynthia Matthews-Hamad, had a master’s degree in counseling and
worked at a Salvation Army shelter as a counselor to battered and
abused women, earning approximately $30,445 per year.182 In seeking to
discharge her $60,000 in student loan debt,183 she argued that her failure
to make more money should not be held against her because she was “at
the top of her profession” and was “unlikely to find other employment in
her field that will pay more than her current position.”184 Citing
Gerhardt, the court held that “the fact that a debtor has a low-paying job
without much upside earning potential is not enough” and denied
discharge.185
The debtor’s economic situation in Mallinckrodt v. Educational Credit
Management Corp. (In re Mallinckrodt)186 was apparently even worse.
George Mallinckrodt had a master’s degree in mental health counseling
but had been able to find only very minimal employment in that field,
earning $6,000 per year.187 Noting that the debtor “only considers posi-
tions in the fields of mental health counseling and tennis instruction”188
and that there was “no evidence” that he had “made efforts to generate
177. A dissenting opinion in the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel suggested that Oyler had
skills in music, audio engineering, and sales that he could use to increase his income. Oyler,
300 B.R. at 260. It is not clear from the opinions whether the Sixth Circuit’s reference to
“education and experience” referred to these skills or whether he acquired them through
higher education.
178. 348 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 2003).
179. Id. at 92.
180. Id. at 93.
181. 377 B.R. 415 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
182. Id. at 419.
183. Id. at 418.
184. Id. at 422.
185. Id.
186. 274 B.R. 560 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002).
187. Id. at 563.
188. Id. Mallinckrodt was a former professional tennis player. Id.
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income outside of his chosen profession,”189 the court reversed the bank-
ruptcy court’s grant of discharge of Mallinckrodt’s $73,000190 in student
loans.191 It held, “The student loan program does not guarantee that
debtors will find financially rewarding employment in the field of their
choice.”192
In sum, empirical scholarship demonstrates that debt distorts students’
career choices, just as Congress feared. That nondischargeability contrib-
utes to this distortion is not just inherently reasonable. It is also shown by
court decisions that deny discharge because the debtor, who is working in
a field for which they trained, should change jobs to make more money.
Such decisions work against the student-loan programs’ goal of career
choice. Decisions that go further, instructing the debtor to abandon the
trained-for field to service loans, further undermine the programs’ goals
by tending to deny society the benefits of the debtor’s education.
C. DISCOURAGEMENT OF BORROWERS: DEBT OVERHANG
Excessive debt may interfere with the debtor’s participation in the
economy and society. If enough of the rewards of the debtor’s economic
activity go to creditors rather than the debtor, the debtor may simply give
up in despair on economic activity and/or social participation.193 This
condition is called “debt overhang.”194
Student-loan debt overhang frustrates the purposes of the student-loan
programs: borrowers who are discouraged from participating in the econ-
omy and society are not using their education to benefit the nation, are
probably not fully pursuing their careers of choice, and likely have been
harmed rather than helped by their student loans. Nondischargeability
would seem to contribute to student-loan debt overhang because elimi-
nating the debts in bankruptcy should stop them from discouraging
debtors.
Indeed, many scholars have cited solving the debt-overhang problem as
a basic justification for American bankruptcy law.195 The debt-overhang
189. Id. at 568.
190. Id. at 563.
191. Id. at 569.
192. Id. at 568.
193. See H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 71 (1973) (stating that excessive debt threatens
“continued and more value-productive participation” in the economy and society); id. at 79
(eliminating excessive debt promotes “continuation of [the debtor’s] household as a social
and economic unit”).
194. See Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 140
(2004) (“Debt-overhang robs [a consumer] of her will to work hard and to save.”).
195. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2017) (noting “the principal economic function” of consumer
bankruptcy is “to grant the debtor a fresh start and thus ameliorate the costs associated
with debt overhang”); Clayton Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Finan-
cially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1437–38 (2014) (arguing that solving debt-
overhang problem for cities is analogous to fresh start in individual bankruptcy); Hynes,
supra note 194, at 140 (stating consumer bankruptcy’s “fresh start” can “remove . . . debt
overhang”); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1393, 1420–24 (1985) (explaining that debt’s reduction of the debtor’s incentives to
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justification for bankruptcy finds support in primary legal sources as well.
The Supreme Court embraced it in 1934 in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt.196
The Court wrote that a “primary purpose[ ]” of the then-existing Bank-
ruptcy Act was to “relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppres-
sive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh”197 by giving the debtor
“a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered
by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”198
Elaborating on the idea of a “clear field for future effort” free from the
“discouragement of pre-existing debt,” the Court wrote:
From the viewpoint of the wage-earner there is little difference be-
tween not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor. . . . The
new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort, which it is
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to afford the emancipated
debtor, would be of little value to the wage-earner if he were obliged
to face the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable portion
of his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the payment of
indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy.199
The legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, which cre-
ated the modern Bankruptcy Code, cited debt overhang as a basis for
giving a fresh start in bankruptcy. The 1973 Report of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which served as the starting
point for the 1978 Act, invoked as a function of bankruptcy law
“rehabilitat[ing] debtors continued and more value-productive participa-
tion,”200 including participation in the economy.201 The legislative history
of subsequent bankruptcy legislation also acknowledges debt overhang.
The Senate committee report for a forerunner bill to the Bankruptcy
Amendment and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984202 states that, in the
presence of “[c]rushing debt burdens,” “work productivity often suffers”
and bankruptcy discharge “allow[s] troubled borrowers to become pro-
ductive members of their communities.”203
earn supports the existence of bankruptcy discharge); Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics
and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1435 (2012) (“Overleveraged
individuals have limited incentives to increase productivity because the gains from their
labor go to their creditors. . . . Bankruptcy . . . [is] a method of fixing this incentive problem
and returning overleveraged individuals . . . to productivity.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., When
Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2217, 2236 n.75 (2014) (“[T]he fresh start in consumer bankruptcy . . . address[es]
debt overhang concerns.”); see also Dalie´ Jime´nez, Ending Perpetual Debts, 55 HOUS. L.
REV. 609, 639 (2018) (writing of situation where debtor is unable to repay loans over a long
period of time: “This debt trap disincentivizes work.”).
196. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
197. Id. at 244 (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 245.
200. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 71 (1973).
201. See id. at 73–74.
202. For the place of the cited Senate committee report in the legislative history of the
1984 Act, see E1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY VI–X (Lawrence E. King et al. eds., 16th ed.
rev. 2019).
203. S. REP. NO. 98-65, at 53 (1983).
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The 1973 bankruptcy commission report also embraced a conception of
debt overhang that included participation not just in the economy, but in
society.204 Although the social dimension of debt overhang apparently
has not received as much attention from scholars or courts as the eco-
nomic dimension,205 it too has a place in American law.
After enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court206 and
appellate courts have repeatedly reaffirmed207 bankruptcy’s purpose of
affording a “clear field for future effort.” Two particularly vivid examples
illustrate that the “clear field” entails the absence of debt overhang as
discussed here.
In Turner v. Boston,208 the Ninth Circuit held that a debtor’s listing of
debts on a bankruptcy petition filed too soon after a previous petition did
not render those debts nondischargeable in a bankruptcy started by a
subsequent, third petition.209 The court wrote, “Society is injured by for-
ever saddling the debtor with undischargeable debts, for the discharge
denied might have provided the debtor ‘with the incentive to use his skills
and talents, and thereby contribute to society even after financial
disaster.’”210
In In re Attanasio,211 the bankruptcy court applied § 707(b), which at
the time authorized the court to dismiss a consumer debtor’s bankruptcy
case for “substantial abuse” of the system.212 Considering whether it
204. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1296–97 (arguing 1973 Bankruptcy Commission ex-
presses concern with social effects of debt overhang).
205. See supra note 195 (citing scholars who emphasize economic dimension of debt
overhang).
206. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128
(1979); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 647 (1974); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648
(1971) (“This Court on numerous occasions has stated” that one of the primary purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act is to give debtors a new opportunity in life and a “clear field for future
effort”); Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (per curiam) (stating “clear field for
future effort” is a “basic purpose” of the Bankruptcy Act); see also Meltzer v. C. Buck
LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 936, 958 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (“Bank-
ruptcy is designed to permit a man to make a new start unhampered by overwhelming
debts in hopes of achieving a useful life.”).
207. For recent decisions, see In re Trump Entm’t. Resorts, 810 F.3d 161, 173 n.55 (3d
Cir. 2016) (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 648); Berger & Assocs. Att’ys, P.C. v. Kran (In re
Kran), 760 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286–87); Pasquina v.
Cunningham (In re Cunningham), 513 F.3d 318, 324 (1st Cir. 2008); Nunnery v. Rountree
(In re Rountree), 478 F.3d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 2007); Jeff v. Sicoroff (In re Sicoroff), 401 F.3d
1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2005); Leonard v. St. Rose Dominican Hosp. (In re Majewski), 310
F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2002); Hickman v. Texas (In re Hickman), 260 F.3d 400, 404 (10th
Cir. 2001); Mason v. Young (In re Young), 237 F.3d 1168, 1178 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating
debtors are not compelled, “in Dickensian fashion, to labor for the rest of their lives under
the crushing weight of gigantic debt; under our law, the world is not to be made a debtor’s
prison by a lifelong sentence of penury”); McCrory v. Spigel (In re Spigel), 260 F.3d 27, 31
(1st Cir. 2001).
208. 393 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1968).
209. Id. at 683–84, 687.
210. Id. at 686 (quoting 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 14.01 (14th ed. 1967)).
211. 218 B.R. 180 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998).
212. Id. at 184. The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
amended § 707(b) so that it now provides for dismissal for “abuse” (rather than for “sub-
stantial abuse”) and for an elaborate and controversial “means test” designed to prevent
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should dismiss the case in light of the debtor’s alleged ability to repay
some loans, the court expressed the debt-overhang thesis with memora-
ble force:
[W]ould not an impoverished debtor be more inclined to simply
throw hands up and give up, rather than continue to work simply for
the purpose of turning all income over and above that needed for
necessities, to creditors, if not allowed the opportunity to improve a
meager existence?213
Finding that the debtor “is being hampered from achieving a useful life
by the burden of overwhelming debts” and that “[r]equiring repay-
ment . . . is likely to cause his . . . work productivity to suffer,”214 the court
refused to dismiss the debtor’s case.215
Turning to student loans specifically, the legislative history of student-
loan nondischargeability does not indicate that Congress found student
debtors somehow immune from debt overhang.216 Indeed, it seems as
though unmanageable student debts are as likely as other unmanageable
debts to keep borrowers from working.217
To be sure, Congress enacted nondischargeability despite the risk of
debt overhang. But the point here is that the scope of nondischargeability
should be evaluated in light of debt overhang’s interference with the pur-
poses of the student-loan programs.218 That interference is manifest: stu-
dent borrowers who are discouraged from participating in the economy
and society are not using their education to benefit society, are probably
not fully pursuing their careers of choice, and likely have been harmed
rather than helped by their student loans.
There appears to have been surprisingly little empirical research on
consumer debt overhang, despite the concept’s legal prominence. Com-
pleted research links self-reported financial stress to work absenteeism219
and indicates that debt overhang reduces consumer investment.220 A
“can-pay” debtors from getting a discharge under Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2012);
Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352–53 (2008) (describing means test as “controversial”
and reporting that data did not suggest that it succeeded in weeding out high-income
abusers).
213. Attanasio, 218 B.R. at 194.
214. See id. at 239.
215. Id. at 241.
216. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1310.
217. Id. at 1322–23.
218. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2–4 (advocating restricting the scope of nondis-
chargeability to further student-loan program goals).
219. See Jinhee Kim & E. Thomas Garman, Financial Stress and Absenteeism: An Em-
pirically Derived Model, 14 FIN. COUNS. & PLAN. 31, 39 (2003). Cf. Jinhee Kim et al.,
Relationship Between Financial Stress and Workplace Absenteeism of Credit Counseling
Clients, 27 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 458, 469–73 (2006) (finding that financial stress in-
creases time spent on financial matters at work but does not have a significant effect on
other measures of absenteeism).
220. See Brian T. Melzer, Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeown-
ers at Risk of Default, 72 J. FIN. 575, 575 (2017). Melzer found that homeowners whose
mortgages exceeded their home values, so that they were at risk of foreclosure, spent less
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number of studies, discussed in the next section, associate student debt
with negative financial outcomes such as lower earnings, net worth, finan-
cial satisfaction, and likelihood of car or home ownership.221 These might
be taken as indirect evidence of debt overhang.
The tax field provides perhaps the strongest evidence that debt over-
hang is likely to be real. Tax scholars have long noted that income taxes
might have two opposing effects on the labor supply.222 The first, analo-
gous to debt overhang, is the “substitution effect”: the fact that people
keep less of what they earn may tend to make them work less, “substitut-
ing” leisure for work.223 The second, and countervailing, effect is the “in-
come effect”: the fact that people get less money for the same amount of
work may induce them to work more to maintain their standard of liv-
ing.224 This effect is analogous to debt-driven pressure to seek higher-
paying jobs, as discussed in the previous part.225
Tax researchers have studied both effects extensively, and the Congres-
sional Budget Office’s recent summary of the research indicates that the
“substitution effect” (the tendency of taxes or debt payments to make
people work less) is decidedly larger than the “income effect” (the ten-
dency of taxes or debt payments to make people work more).226 On net,
the population in aggregate seems to work less when taxes (or, presuma-
bly, debt payments) increase.
For a concrete example of the aggregate effect, we can look to IDR
programs. Under such programs, the student-loan payment may be as lit-
tle as 10% of income in excess of 150% of the poverty line.227 According
to the Congressional Budget Office’s tax models, a middle-of-the-road
estimate is that 10% of after-tax228 income from the entire population
would reduce labor output by something in the neighborhood of 3%.229
on home repairs than other homeowners. Id. They did not spend less on appliances and
cars, which, unlike homes, the debtors would not lose in the event of foreclosure. Id.
221. See discussion supra Part III.D.
222. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1920 (1987).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See discussion supra Part III.B.
226. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW THE SUPPLY OF LABOR RESPONDS TO CHANGES
IN FISCAL POLICY 4 tbl.1 (2012) [hereinafter CBO, SUPPLY OF LABOR] (noting substitution
effect greater than income effect); Robert McClelland & Shannon Mok, A Review of Re-
cent Research on Labor Supply Elasticities, 30 tbl.2 (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper
No. 2012-12, 2012) (stating that substitution effect is generally greater than income effect);
id. at 30–41 tbl.3–6 (summarizing studies).
227. Income-Driven Plans, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-
loans/understand/plans/income-driven [https://perma.cc/3U5U-PSD4] (last visited Oct. 8,
2019).
228. See CBO, SUPPLY OF LABOR, supra note 226, at 5 (explaining that CBO elasticity
estimates refer to after-tax earnings). Because IDR apparently takes 10% of pre-tax discre-
tionary income, it is likely to take more than 10% of post-tax income for many borrowers
(i.e., those who earn significantly more than 150% of the federal poverty level and pay
significant income taxes).
229. Id. (providing illustrative calculation of tax increase’s effect on labor supply); see
also Bankman & Griffith, supra note 222, at 1923 (reporting that then-current studies
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The reduction is estimated to be larger for lower-income groups,230 into
which many IDR payers considering bankruptcy may fall.
Tax research is concerned with overall net effects, and it bears high-
lighting that that is not exactly our concern here. Some borrowers’ career
plans are distorted as they seek higher-paying jobs to service debt. Some
borrowers are discouraged by debt and give up altogether. Although
these effects net out in studies like those just cited, for us the analysis is
just the opposite: the effects are cumulative. Distortions are distortions.
The medical student who would prefer family practice but becomes a ra-
diologist to pay debts231 represents a failure of the student-loan pro-
grams’ purposes, just as does the borrower discouraged by debt from
participating in the labor force at all. One of each makes two failures, not
zero net failures.
D. HARM TO BORROWERS
Some student-loan recipients—an astonishing 44% of younger borrow-
ers, according to a recently published media poll232—regret ever taking
out loans to go to college in the first place. Such students, and students
like them who attended institutions other than colleges, seem likely to be
worse off because they took out student loans. If such borrowers cannot
discharge their loans in bankruptcy, nondischargeability perpetuates this
worse-off-for-borrowing condition. To the extent it does so, it undermines
achievement of another goal of the student-loan programs: making bor-
rowers better off.233
A sizeable body of evidence now indicates that being in debt is harm-
ful. A meta-analysis published in 2013 of sixty-five studies found that
“[t]here was a statistically significant relationship between debt and pres-
ence of a mental disorder, depression, suicide completion, suicide com-
pletion or attempt, problem drinking, drug dependence, neurotic
disorders . . . and psychotic disorders.”234 Specific indicia of over-indebt-
showed “compensated” (i.e., ignoring income effect) elasticities for men of between 0.1
and 0.3).
230. See CBO SUPPLY OF LABOR, supra note 226, at 4 tbl.1.
231. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
232. See Hillary Hoffower, Nearly Half of Indebted Millennials Say College Wasn’t
Worth It, and the Reason Is Obvious, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2019, 12:09 PM), https://www
.businessinsider.de/millennials-college-not-worth-student-loan-debt-2019-4?r=US&IR=T
[https://perma.cc/KCW6-CQGC] (reporting on survey of 1,207 Americans aged twenty-two
to thirty-seven who have or had student debts that found that 21% of respondents said that
college was “definitely” not worth it given their loans and that 23% of respondents said
that college “probably” was not worth it).
233. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
234. See Thomas Richardson et al., The Relationship Between Personal Unsecured Debt
and Mental and Physical Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 33 CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. REV. 1148, 1153 (2013). Through doing a meta-analysis, the authors achieved a
pooled sample size of almost 34,000 for inquiry into mental disorder. Id. tbl.1. For exam-
ples of studies linking debt to depression, see Sarah Bridges & Richard Disney, Debt and
Depression, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 338, 392 (2010); Richard Reading & Shirley Reynolds,
Debt, Social Disadvantage and Maternal Depression, 53 SOC. SCI. & MED. 441, 447 tbl.3,
448 tbl.5 (2001). Looking beyond strictly indebtedness to financial strain in general, re-
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edness, such as the debt-to-assets ratio,235 the occurrence of repossession
or other debt-collection events,236 or using a credit-counseling agency,237
have been associated with various negative health effects.
Researchers have associated negative effects with student loans specifi-
cally: student loans have been found to be associated with lower post-
graduation income;238 lower future net worth (with net worth calculated
excluding the student loans)239 and satisfaction with personal finances;240
lower probability of owning a house241 or car,242 or getting married;243 a
searchers reportedly have found links to smoking, obesity, and psychological symptoms.
See Jinhee Kim & Swarn Chatterjee, Student Loans, Health, and Life Satisfaction of US
Households: Evidence from a Panel Study, 40 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 36, 36–37 (2019)
(reporting on studies); Eva Selenko & Bernard Batinic, Beyond Debt. A Moderator Analy-
sis of the Relationship Between Perceived Financial Strain and Mental Health, 73 SOC. SCI.
& MED. 1725, 1727–28 (2011) (among Austrian credit-counseling clients who were filing
for bankruptcy, perceived financial strain was highly correlated with poor mental health,
but the gross amount of debt “did not play a role” in mental health).
235. See Frederick J. Zimmerman & Wayne Katon, Socioeconomic Status, Depression
Disparities, and Financial Strain: What Lies Behind the Income-Depression Relationship?,
14 HEALTH ECON. 1197, 1211 (2005).
236. See Steven Garasky et al., Family Stressors and Child Obesity, 38 SOC. SCI. RES.
755, 759, 763 (2009).
237. See Eva Mu¨nster et al., Over-Indebtedness as a Marker of Socioeconomic Status
and Its Association with Obesity: A Cross-Sectional Study, 9 BMC PUB. HEALTH 286, 287,
290 (2009).
238. See Minicozzi, supra note 161, at 420–21 (finding that students with more educa-
tion debt had higher initial salaries but lower salary growth); Justin Weidner, Does Student
Debt Reduce Earnings? i (Nov. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://
scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jweidner/files/Weidner_JMP.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V228-24GF] (“I find that graduates with an additional ten thousand dollars of debt have 1-
2% lower income one year after graduation.”).
239. See William Elliott & IlSung Nam, Is Student Debt Jeopardizing the Short-Term
Financial Health of U.S. Households?, 95 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 405, 412–13
(2013).
240. See RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH PROJECT, YOUNG ADULTS, STUDENT DEBT,
AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 18 (2014), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/05/14/
young-adults-student-debt-and-economic-well-being/ [https://perma.cc/RDA2-QQ7V].
241. See Alvaro A. Mezza et al., Student Loans and Homeownership i (Fed. Reserve
Bd., Working Paper No. 2016-010, 2017); Rajashri Chakrabarti et al., Diplomas to Door-
steps: Education, Student Debt, and Homeownership, LIBERTY ST. ECON. BLOG (Apr. 3,
2017), https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2017/04/diplomas-to-doorsteps-edu-
cation-student-debt-and-homeownership.html [https://perma.cc/JM27-CGRH]. Although a
2015 study’s review of the then-existing literature concluded that “the evidence is mixed”
regarding a connection between student loans and homeownership, the study itself found a
negative association between the presence of student debt and homeownership, at least in
some models. See Jason Houle & Lawrence Berger, Is Student Loan Debt Discouraging
Homeownership Among Young Adults?, 89 SOC. SERV. REV. 589, 589, 593 (2015). A recent
survey of loan officers suggests that debt can interfere with homebuying. It reports that
student loans increase the ratio of debt payments to income, which must be below certain
levels for the borrower to qualify for certain types of mortgages. See Clarence C. Rose,
Overcoming the Obstacles Student Debt Presents to the Ability to Buy a Home, 70 J. FIN.
SERV. PROFS. 72, 77 (2016). This suggests student debt makes it harder to buy a house.
242. See Meta Brown & Sydney Caldwell, Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat from
Housing and Auto Markets, LIBERTY ST. ECON. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013), https://libertystreet
economics.newyorkfed.org/2013/04/young-student-loan-borrowers-retreat-from-housing-
and-auto-markets.html [https://perma.cc/QQU7-EVX9] (measuring auto debt at age
twenty-five).
243. SUSAN P. CHOY & C. DENNIS CARROLL, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DEBT
BURDEN FOUR YEARS AFTER COLLEGE 46 (2000) (stating that although “concern exists
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higher risk of experiencing future financial difficulties;244 and a lower
probability of pursuing further education.245 They have been associated
with lower self-reported mental health246 and with greater risk of mate-
rial hardship, health-care hardship, and financial difficulty.247 A recent
study finds the amount of student debt “negatively associated with . . . life
satisfaction and psychological well-being after controlling for other types
of debt, such as medical and credit card debt, assets and income, and a
number of other sociodemographic factors.”248
The risk of harm from educational debt appears to be distributed along
income and racial lines. As compared to white students, African-Ameri-
can students are more likely to borrow249 and borrow larger amounts.250
African-American student-loan borrowers are more likely than white
that heavy borrowing for education may affect lifestyle choices, such as delaying mar-
riage,” as of 1997 “[a]mong 1992–93 bachelor’s degree recipients, there is no evidence of
such effects”). Compare Dora Gicheva, Student Loans or Marriage? A Look at the Highly
Educated, 53 ECON. EDUC. REV. 207, 207 (2016) (“Using data from a panel survey of regis-
trants for the Graduate Management Admission Test, I show that the amount of accumu-
lated student debt is negatively related to the probability of first marriage.”), with Lei
Zhang, Effects of College Educational Debt on Graduate School Attendance and Early Ca-
reer and Lifestyle Choices, 21 EDUC. ECON. 154, 154 (2013) (“[D]ebt has no effects on early
career choices such as salary, sector of occupation, marital status, and homeownership.”).
244. See Jesse Bricker & Jeffrey Thompson, Does Education Loan Debt Influence
Household Financial Distress? An Assessment Using the 2007–2009 Survey of Consumer
Finances Panel, 34 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 660, 661 (2016) (noting association with pay-
ment delinquency and credit denial).
245. Fos et al., supra note 123, at 1.
246. See Katrina M. Walsemann et al., Sick of Our Loans: Student Borrowing and the
Mental Health of Young Adults in the United States, 124 SOC. SCI. & MED. 85, 86 (2015).
The authors acknowledged that the effect they found “may seem modest.” Id. at 91.
247. See Mathieu R. Despard et al., Student Debt and Hardship: Evidence from a Large
Sample of Low- and Medium-Income Households, 70 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 8, 12
(2016).
248. See Kim & Chatterjee, supra note 234, at 36 (2019). The authors also found a
negative relationship between past student debt and health for LatinX individuals. Id. at
46.
249. See Michal Grinstein-Weiss et al., Racial Disparities in Education Debt Burden
Among Low- and Moderate-Income Households, 65 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 166,
166 (2016) (finding that based on a study of a low- and medium-income sample, “the odds
of student loan indebtedness are twice as high for [low- and moderate-income] Black stu-
dents as for White counterparts”); Brandon A. Jackson & John R. Reynolds, The Price of
Opportunity: Race, Student Loan Debt, and College Achievement, 83 SOC. INQUIRY 335,
340–41, 344 (2013) (reporting that 57% of African-American students and 48% of white
students starting college in 1995–1996 had taken out student loans by 2001); Aissa
Canchola & Seth Frotman, The Significant Impact of Student Debt on Communities of
Color, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU BLOG (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.consumerfin
ance.gov/about-us/blog/significant-impact-student-debt-communities-color/ [https://perma
.cc/W4FS-4TRC] (reporting that based on 2011–2012 data, among fourth-year undergradu-
ates, 90% of African-American students and 66% of white students had student loan
debts).
250. See JUDITH SCOTT-CLAYTON & JING LI, BROOKINGS INST., BLACK-WHITE DIS-
PARITY IN STUDENT LOAN DEBT MORE THAN TRIPLES AFTER GRADUATION 1 (2016) (re-
porting that upon graduation, African-American college graduates owe $7,400 more on
average than white graduates).
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ones to carry excessive student debt burdens251 and undergo default.252
Unlike the median white borrower, the median African-American bor-
rower on average experiences a growing rather than a shrinking student-
loan balance.253
Moreover, African-American people apparently derive less economic
security from higher education than white people. Professor Abbye At-
kinson has found that “African-Americans in bankruptcy are just as likely
to have earned a college degree as African-Americans in the general pop-
ulation.”254 Among white people, by contrast, bankrupt debtors are less
likely to have a college degree than the general population.255 With more
negative effects and fewer positive effects from debt-funded education, it
seems likely that African-American people are more likely to suffer harm
from student borrowing.256
Of course, student loans can have positive effects as well as negative
ones. Most obviously, student loans may make a borrower’s higher edu-
cation possible. The author has found surprisingly little academic re-
search that attempts to measure the net positive or negative effect of
student borrowing. One study finds that households with a four-year col-
lege graduate have higher net worth than others, even controlling for stu-
dent debt,257 and another finds that finishing a degree is itself associated
with better mental health, although the degree does not shield the holder
251. See Derek V. Price, Educational Debt Burden Among Student Borrowers: An
Analysis of the Baccalaureate & Beyond Panel, 1997 Follow-Up, 45 RES. HIGHER EDUC.
701, 718 (2004).
252. See Ben Miller, New Federal Data Show a Student Loan Crisis for African Ameri-
can Borrowers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS tbl.4 (Oct. 16, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.ameri
canprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/news/2017/10/16/440711/new-federal-data-
show-student-loan-crisis-african-american-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/67RA-63KP] (re-
porting that among students who entered college in 2003–2004 and took out federal loans
for undergraduate education, 49% of African-American borrowers and 21% of white bor-
rowers defaulted within twelve years after entry).
253. See id. tbl.2 (reporting that median African-American borrower owes 113% of
original loan balance twelve years after college entry, while average white borrower owes
65%).
254. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 11.
255. Id. at 11–12.
256. Although more research examines outcomes for African-American people than
for other groups, studies have found that LatinX students are more likely to take out stu-
dent loans, see Canchola & Frotman, supra note 249, and more likely to default, see Miller,
supra note 252, at tbl.4, than white students. The median LatinX student makes less pro-
gress on repayment in the twelve years after college entry than the median white student.
See Miller, supra note 252, tbl.2. Native students have been found more likely to default
than white students. See J. Fredericks Volkwein et al., Factors Associated with Student
Loan Default Among Different Racial and Ethnic Groups, 69 J. HIGHER EDUC. 206, 216
fig.1 (1998). See generally Dalie´ Jime´nez, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Irvine Sch. of
Law, Written Testimony of Dalie´ Jime´nez Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law 4–7 (June 25, 2019), available at https://
www.law.uci.edu/news/in-the-news/2019/Jimenez-testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY4D-
TMTF] (collecting research on effects of student loans on disadvantaged groups).
257. See Elliott & Nam, supra note 239, at 420. The authors presumably refer to a table
showing that the positive effect of a four-year degree on net worth was greater than the
negative effect of student loans. Id. at 414 tbl.4.
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from the negative mental-health effects of student loans.258 Although
these studies focus on graduates, a recent study of homebuying concludes
that even student debtors who attend college but do not graduate are
more likely to own homes than those who do not pursue college at all, at
least after age twenty-seven.259
These findings suggest that student-loan borrowing is, on average, justi-
fied where necessary to earn a degree. But debt-financed education is a
risky investment, even if it may on average be a good one. Some students
are harmed, even if most are helped. One study finds a net positive effect
of student debt on the likelihood of financial distress, even taking into
account education’s positive effects on financial well-being.260 This find-
ing is particularly relevant to us, given that nondischargeability most af-
fects borrowers with below-average economic outcomes.
IV. RECONCILING NONDISCHARGEABILITY
WITH THE PROGRAMS’ PURPOSES
Part IV argues that nondischargeability can and should be reformed to
reduce its interference with the overall goals of the student-loan pro-
grams. Part IV.A argues that considering the overall objectives of the
student-loan programs counsels a narrow application of nondis-
chargeability, limiting it to cases where its purposes are served and it does
not unduly interfere with other goals of the programs. Part IV.B argues
that although approaches other than freer dischargeability could help stu-
dent borrowers, liberalizing discharge is a particularly attractive solution
because courts can do it without Congress. The Department can also act
on nondischargeability and—unlike with other possible approaches to
helping overburdened students—has shown some inclination to do so.
Part IV.C presents four specific proposals for harmonizing nondis-
chargeability with the student-loan programs’ overall design. It advocates
(1) increasing public awareness of the availability of bankruptcy as a po-
tential solution to student-loan debt; (2) stopping the practice of penaliz-
ing bankrupt student debtors for working in fields in which they have
been trained; (3) granting discharge to debtors whose debts are particu-
larly likely to discourage them from participating in the economy and
society; and (4) allowing discharge where the student loans have harmed,
rather than helped, the borrower.
258. See Walsemann et al., supra note 247, at 89–90, 89 tbl.2 (“[E]ducation . . . did not
moderate the relationship between cumulative student loans and psychological
functioning.”).
259. See Raji Chakrabarti et al., Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Press Briefing on House-
hold Debt, with Focus on Student Debt 41 (Apr. 3, 2017), available at https://www.newyork
fed.org/medialibrary/media/press/PressBriefing-Household-Student-Debt-April32017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3C65-SJ79].
260. Bricker & Thompson, supra note 244, at 671.
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A. NONDISCHARGEABILITY SHOULD BE APPLIED NARROWLY IN
LIGHT OF THE STUDENT-LOAN PROGRAMS’ OBJECTIVES
Despite the tension with the overall goals of the student-loan program,
Congress did enact the student-loan nondischargeability provision261 and
has repeatedly amended it.262 Indeed, the amendments have expanded
both the time periods and the types of loans to which nondischargeability
applies.263 Congress thus has determined that nondischargeability serves
a purpose. Scholars264 and courts265 have identified two basic goals: com-
bating borrower opportunism and enhancing creditor recoveries. The par-
adigmatic case of borrower opportunism is the doctor or lawyer who
discharges student debts just before beginning a lucrative career when the
borrower has few assets to liquidate.266
However, crucially, Congress did not choose to promote these pur-
poses through a flat ban on discharging student loans. Instead, nondis-
chargeability has always been subject to an exception courts have
261. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (ad-
ding conditional nondischargeability provision to HEA of 1965).
262. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 523, 92 Stat. 2549,
2590–91 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)) (amending conditional
nondischargeability provision and incorporating it into newly created Bankruptcy Code);
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(2), 104 Stat. 4789, 4964–65 (codi-
fied as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012)); Higher Education Amendments of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 1581, 1837 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) (2012)); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(8) (2012)).
263. The original nondischargeability provision provided that student loans it covered
could be discharged without a showing of undue hardship after five years of repayment.
See Education Amendments § 127(a); Bankruptcy Reform Act § 523. The Crime Control
Act of 1990 increased this period to seven years, see Crime Control Act § 3621(2), and the
Higher Education Amendments of 1998 completely eliminated discharge of covered loans
without a showing of undue hardship, see Higher Education Amendments § 971(a).
BAPCPA extended nondischargeability for the first time to private loans not issued or
backed by the government. See BAPCPA § 220.
264. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1300 (stating that the “underlying purposes” of nondis-
chargeability are to “combat abuse and to promote financial recovery”); Terrence L.
Michael & Janie M. Phelps, “Judges?!—We Don’t Need No Stinking Judges!!!”: The Dis-
charge of Student Loans in Bankruptcy Cases and the Income Contingent Repayment Plan,
38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 73, 77–81 (2005) (focusing on fear of opportunism); Rafael I. Pardo
& Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment
of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 425 (2005) [hereinafter
Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts] (noting concern expressed by
nondischargeability proponents with “financial solvency of the federal student loan pro-
gram” and “purported abuse of the bankruptcy system” by borrowers).
265. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.14[1] (Lawrence E. King et al. eds., 16th ed.
rev. 2019). (“[C]ourts have focused on two purposes of this exception to discharge:
preventing abuses of the educational loan system . . . and safeguarding the financial integ-
rity of governmental entities and nonprofit institutions.”). For examples, see Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 400 (4th Cir. 2005); Educ. Credit
Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306 (10th Cir. 2004); Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw
(In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2000); Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency. v.
Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Cheesman, 25 F.3d 356, 359 (6th
Cir. 1994).
266. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 133 (1978) (indicating that reports of the behavior
described in the text “have generated the movement for an exception to discharge”).
764 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
described as “open-ended.”267 Student loans have always been discharge-
able upon a showing of “undue hardship.”268 This vague phrase contains
little to guide courts and the Department in interpreting and applying
it.269
Judicial and administrative officials should interpret “undue hardship”
in light of the overall purposes of the statutory scheme that governs the
federal student-loan programs. Absent meaningful textual constraint, ref-
erence to legislative purpose is critical.270 And the relevant purpose is not
that of the nondischargeability provision in isolation. Where, as here, the
provision in question is embedded in a complex statutory scheme, deter-
mining purpose “requires an examination of all legislation in [the] partic-
ular field.”271 The Supreme Court explained the principle in an opinion
interpreting the Bankruptcy Act together with a related statute:
[T]he court . . . will take in connection with [the specific clause at
issue] the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and the
objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions,
and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will
of the Legislature.272
267. See, e.g., Tetzlaff v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 794 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2015)
(describing undue-hardship standard as “open-ended”); Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp., 713 F.3d 882, 885 (7th Cir. 2013) (same).
268. See Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081,
2141 (1976) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3 (1996)) (including “undue-hard-
ship” discharge provision in new § 439A of HEA of 1965).
269. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys), 446 F.3d 938, 943 (“‘Undue
hardship’ is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.”). All the text seems to require is that a
hardship exist and that it be (according to whatever standard) “undue,” meaning “exces-
sive” or “disproportionate.” See Frushour, 433 F.3d at 399 (“ordinary” or “general” mean-
ing of “undue” is “unwarranted” or “excessive”); Undue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th
ed. 2019) (“excessive or unwarranted”); Undue, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/212679?redirectedFrom=undue#eid [https://perma.cc/
5AZY-D8N8 ] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (“not appropriate or suitable; improper”; “not in
accordance with what is just and right; unjustifiable; illegal”; “going beyond what is appro-
priate, warranted, or natural; excessive”); Undue, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/undue [https://perma.cc/E3E2-L9HN] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2019) (“exceeding or violating propriety or fitness: excessive”). A Google search
on “define undue” performed August 1, 2019, returns the result “unwarranted or inappro-
priate because excessive or disproportionate.” Undue, GOOGLE, http://google.com [https://
perma.cc/SXQ6-7UTR] (search “define undue”) (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). Without a stat-
utory definition for “hardship” or standard for what is “undue,” the text standing alone is
of little help to those who must apply it.
270. See STEPHEN G. BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 81
(2010) (“[J]udges faced with open-ended language and a difficult interpretive question rely
heavily on purposes and related consequences.”); John F. Manning, The New Purposivism,
2011 S. CT. REV. 113, 173 (2011) (“Certainly . . . when an interpreter makes sense of an
open-ended statute, it is appropriate if not necessary to read such a statute in light of the
broad purposes that inspired its enactment.”).
271. See NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 45:10 (7th ed. 2018); see also id. 2B § 51:1 (“Other statutes dealing with the
same subject as the one being construed . . . are . . . useful in questions of interpretation.”).
272. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60
U.S. 183, 194 (1856)). Bankruptcy is not the only complex field of federal law where the
Supreme Court has construed statutes on similar subjects together. One other example
comes from environmental law. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 (1979) (interpreting
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, together with Eagle Protection Act and Endangered Species
2019] Tempering Bankruptcy Nondischargeability 765
The student-loan nondischargeability provision of the Bankruptcy
Code273 is, given the common subject matter, related to the student-loan
provisions of the HEA.274 Indeed, the nondischargeability provision is
more than just related to the HEA because it actually had its origin in the
1976 amendments to that statute.275 Thus, the purposes of the student-
loan programs as discussed in this article are relevant in defining whether
the elastic phrase “undue hardship” should be given a broad or a narrow
scope.
Unfortunately, courts typically have not interpreted “undue hardship”
in light of the overarching design of the student-loan programs.276 In-
stead, when they have looked to statutory purpose, they have considered
the goals of the nondischargeability provision itself in isolation.277 For its
Act). Another comes from labor law. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics,
Inc., 563 U.S. 1, 13 (2011) (adopting broad interpretation of Fair Labor Standards Act
provision in part because Supreme Court had adopted a broad interpretation of a parallel
provision of another labor statute with “similar enforcement needs”). A third comes from
immigration law. See INS. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 502 U.S. 183, 187, 194 n.8
(1991) (interpreting provision of Immigration and Nationality Act in light of a “concern”
of “the immigration laws” that the Court grounded in part in the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986, which amended the INA but not the provision in question). In a
famous antitrust case below the Supreme Court level, Judge Learned Hand interpreted the
Sherman Act in light of two related statutes. See United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 428–29 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 & n.5 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (supporting finding as to purpose of one statute with provisions of
related statutes).
273. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
274. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1087-2, 1087a–1087j, 1087aa–1087ii (2012).
275. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1302–04 (discussing enactment of nondischargeability
provision in Education Amendments of 1976 and replacement of that provision with a
substantially identical one in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). Because of the undue-
hardship provision’s origin in the HEA, the provision arguably should be construed with
the HEA under the whole-act rule. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 271, § 47:2 (stating
that the “whole-act” approach to statutory interpretation, under which “courts read to-
gether an entire act” is “probably the best approach”).
276. This conclusion is based on the author’s review of the 107 results of the following
search in Westlaw’s federal cases database on May 16, 2019: “student loan” and “undue
hardship” and (purpose /s “student loan” /s program). It also reflects the author’s impres-
sion from reading many student-loan bankruptcy cases over a period of time. Courts have
on occasion stated—without offering evidence—that in general terms nondischargeability
supports the federal student-loan program’s survival, without referring specifically to the
program’s purposes. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d
393, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing avoiding “fiscal doom” and “ensuring public support”
as reasons for nondischargeability); In re Williams, 296 B.R. 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding Congress intended nondischargeability “to reduce bankruptcy defaults, and
thereby advance the original purposes of student loan programs, i.e. to assure that stu-
dents . . . would have . . . access to low interest rate loans”) (citing and quoting Elmore v.
Mass. Higher Educ. Assistance Corp. (In re Elmore), 230 B.R. 22, 25 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1999)); Doernte v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Doernte), Bankr. No. 10-24280-JAD,
2017 WL 2312226, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. May 25, 2017); Jones v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp. (In re Jones), 495 B.R. 674, 684 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013). As noted, the influential
Brunner decision appealed to its idea of the program’s purpose but did not cite any evi-
dence of that purpose. See discussion supra note 4 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 265 and cases cited therein. On the relatively rare occasions when
courts have addressed legislative policies beyond those specific to the nondischargeability
provision, they have discussed bankruptcy’s fresh-start policy rather than the policies of the
student-loan programs. See, e.g., Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 782
(8th Cir. 2009) (concluding that student-loan dischargeability reflects “an exception to the
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part, the Department has deferred to the courts.278
But a proper interpretation of “undue hardship” is not just about the
nondischargeability-specific goals of combating borrower opportunism
and producing monetary recoveries for student-loan creditors, possibly
balanced against the fresh-start policy. A proper interpretation of “undue
hardship” is also about equality of access to higher education, giving the
country the benefit of an educated population, enabling free choice of
career, and benefiting students.279
In other words, a proper interpretation of “undue hardship” takes ac-
count not just of discharge-disfavoring statutory purposes, but also of dis-
charge-favoring ones. A proper application of the provision denies
discharge only where denial (1) actually helps achieve the underlying
goals of nondischargeability and (2) does so to an extent that outweighs
the extent to which denying discharge impedes the achievement of other
statutory goals, such as those set forth in this article.
In sum, this article does not argue that the purposes of the student-loan
programs provide a basis under existing law for reading nondis-
chargeability out of the Bankruptcy Code altogether.280 The article does
argue that the overarching purposes of student loans compel a more gen-
erous interpretation of “undue hardship” than the one that emerges from
existing judicial analyses, which do not take account of these purposes. A
companion paper develops a general alternative to the Brunner test
based on this argument.281 The remainder of this article argues that as
both a doctrinal and a practical matter, dischargeability should be ex-
panded in four specific ways that advance the overall goals of the student-
loan programs without undermining the core purposes of the nondis-
chargeability provision.
B. USING BANKRUPTCY TO ADVANCE CONGRESS’S
STUDENT-LOAN OBJECTIVES
The work reviewed in Part III seems to stand for the proposition that
student loans themselves are a deeply flawed way of achieving what Con-
gress set out to accomplish. Means other than bankruptcy could be used
to achieve the goals of the student-loan programs more effectively. These
‘fresh start’”); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 364 (6th
Cir. 2007) (holding that debtor could establish undue hardship without enrollment in IDR
program because contrary conclusion “runs counter to the Bankruptcy Code’s aim in pro-
viding debtors a ‘fresh start’”).
278. See LYNN MAHAFFIE, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC.,
DCL ID: GEN 15-13, LETTER ON UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE OF TITLE IV LOANS IN
BANKRUPTCY ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS 3 (2015) [hereinafter DOE Letter] (“Congress
has never defined ‘undue hardship’ in the Bankruptcy Code and has not delegated to the
Department the authority to do so. Federal courts have established the legal standard
for . . . ‘undue hardship.’”).
279. See discussion supra Part II.
280. The arguments in the article arguably do provide a rationale for congressional re-
peal of the undue-hardship requirement. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
281. See John Patrick Hunt, Student Loan Purpose and the Brunner Test (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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include increasing grants, limiting tuition, easing repayment through
more generous IDR, screening programs and/or students before lending,
and offering debt forgiveness programs outside of bankruptcy.
Full consideration of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Part IV.B argues simply, without disparaging alternative approaches,
that bankruptcy can help promote Congress’s purposes and is currently
the only game in town. The Department and the judiciary can offer bank-
ruptcy-based relief, and the Department has shown some interest in do-
ing so. By contrast, the other approaches just mentioned all require
legislation, or at least action the Department has shown no inclination to
take. Considering alternative approaches in turn makes the point.
One approach to addressing student debt problems would be to reduce
the need for debt in the first place. However, maximum grants under the
main federal grant program, the Pell program,282 are set by Congress and
are not discretionary for other actors in the system.283 On the cost side,
the HEA does not provide for federal control of tuition and fees.284
Another approach would be to ease repayment through plans that al-
low lower payments. The existing IDR programs285 are designed to do
just that. It appears that the Department actually could make IDR more
generous without congressional action.286 However, without Congress,
the Department cannot fix the possible tax liability for borrowers whose
debts might one day be cancelled under the program287 or alter statutory
provisions that allow for “negative amortization”—an increase in the bor-
282. Pell grants reportedly accounted for 72% of federal grant aid to undergraduates in
2015–2016. CASSANDRIA DORTCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45418, FEDERAL PELL
GRANT PROGRAM OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT: PRIMER 1 (2018).
283. The total maximum Pell grant is the sum of a discretionary maximum grant, set by
Congress in the appropriations process, and a mandatory add-on, prescribed in the HEA.
Id. at 5.
284. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, §§101–898, 79 Stat. 1219,
1219–70 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1161aa (2012)). The HEA does pre-
scribe tuition in limited circumstances, such as requiring in-state tuition for ser-
vicemembers’ families. See 20 U.S.C. § 1015d. It also provides for grant incentives to
institutions that offer low tuition, contingent on appropriations. Id. § 1161m.
285. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. 4816 (2010) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (2007 IBR provi-
sions were “targeted . . . to people who had the most difficult time repaying their loan”;
2010 IBR changes would “make college much more affordable for students even after they
graduate”); id. at 4857 (statement of Sen. Cardin) (stating that proposed changes would
“make[ ] it easier” for borrowers “to repay federal loans”). ICR likewise was designed to
ease repayment. See 1993 OBRA Hearings, supra note 32, at 5 (statement of Sen. Pell)
(stating that ICR “will help reduce defaults”).
286. Section 1087e(d) is the statutory basis for the ICR, PAYE, and REPAYE plans. See
Hunt, supra note 86, at 1313. Section 1087e(d)(1)(D) provides for “varying annual repay-
ment amounts based on the income of the borrower, paid over an extended period of time
prescribed by the Secretary, not to exceed 25 years.” 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(d)(1)(D). The De-
partment has exercised its discretion under this provision to establish differing repayment
percentages and periods for different programs. See Income Driven Plans, supra note 227
(for undergraduate loans, providing maximum repayment of 20% of discretionary income
over twenty-five years for ICR, and 10% of discretionary income over twenty years for
PAYE and REPAYE). The Secretary seems to have comparable flexibility under the statu-
tory authority for IBR. See 20 U.S.C. § 1098e(a)(3)(B), (b)(1), (e)(1).
287. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1340–49 (discussing potential tax liability upon cancel-
lation of loans under IDR and bankruptcy courts’ handling of the issue).
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rower’s loan balance resulting from payments insufficient to cover ac-
cumulating interest.288 Bankruptcy does not suffer from these
drawbacks.289 In any event, there is no indication that the Department
plans to make IDR more generous.
The government could also ease repayment through debt forgiveness
outside bankruptcy, and several forgiveness programs already exist.290
The most celebrated such program, PSLF,291 has terms that are specified
by statute, and only Congress could expand it.292 Moreover, PSLF so far
appears to be a failure for the vast majority of applicants, as only (almost
exactly) 1% of applications for forgiveness have been successful as of the
Department’s most recent report.293 Most other federal loan-forgiveness
programs appear quite small294 or are limited in the amount of balance
forgiven.295 Presidential candidates have made proposals for more sweep-
ing programs, but these apparently require congressional action296 and, in
288. See id. at 1339–40 (discussing possibility of negative amortization under IDR); see
also Swafford v. King (In re Swafford), 604 B.R. 46, 52–53 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2019) (ac-
knowledging mental and emotional harm to debtor from negative amortization).
289. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that discharge in bankruptcy does
not generate debt-forgiveness income). Insofar as Chapter 7 bankruptcies typically do not
involve payment plans for unsecured debt such as student loans, the concept of negative
amortization does not apply. See Chapter 7—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, https://www
.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics
[https://perma.cc/Q9P6-HJC4] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (noting that Chapter 7 involves
liquidation of assets rather than creation of payment plans).
290. Curiously, the Department’s website does not appear to feature a complete list of
loan forgiveness programs. For an unofficial list, see Dori Zinn, The Complete List of Loan
Forgiveness Programs and Options, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Jan. 2, 2019), https://student
loanhero.com/featured/the-complete-list-of-student-loan-forgiveness-programs/ [https://per
ma.cc/YM3X-XH7C].
291. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. S11,245–52 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Sen.
Brown) (stating that PSLF, among other aspects of legislation, will enable students to “be
able to relieve themselves of the huge burden of debt they face”); id. S11,252 (statement of
Sen. Feingold) (stating that PSLF will help students who “want to pursue careers in public
service” but “unfortunate[ly] . . . are forced to consider their debt loads when deciding
which jobs to take or pursue”).
292. See 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m) (2012) (specifying conditions for PSLF).
293. See Public Service Loan Forgiveness Data: June 2019 PSLF Report, FED. STUDENT
AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/fstudent/loan-forgiveness/pslf-data
[https://perma.cc/44LK-N7F3] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019). The report states that as of June
30, 2019, 110,729 PSLF applications had been received. Id. And 1,216 (1.00%) had been
approved by the servicer; 100,835 (91.06%) had been rejected; and 8,677 (7.84%) were still
in process. Id. PSLF discharges had been processed for only 845 applicants (0.93% of the
90,962 borrowers who had submitted applications). Id. An additional 720 requests had
been approved and 681 discharges actually processed for applicants under the special Tem-
porary Expanded Public Service Loan Forgiveness program. Id.
294. See, e.g., Loan Repayment Assistance Program, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www
.lsc.gov/grants-grantee-resources/our-grant-programs/loan-repayment-assistance-program
[https://perma.cc/23M9-MGR6] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (reporting that loan repayment
program aided eighty people in 2018).
295. See Teacher Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/re
pay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/teacher [https://perma.cc/R8C9-PYY6] (last visited Oct.
14, 2019) (reporting that maximum forgiveness under program is $5,000, or $17,500 for
certain math, science, and special education teachers).
296. See, e.g., Rebecca Klar, Warren Introduces Bill to Cancel Student Loan Debt for
Millions, HILL (July 23, 2019, 11:13 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/454293-war
ren-introduces-bill-that-would-cancel-student-loan-debt-for-millions [https://perma.cc/
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any event, probably depend on the election of the proposing candidate.
A third approach to the student-debt problem, favored by some com-
mentators, is to “screen” schools and courses of study—to refuse to lend,
or to lend at higher rates, to fund disfavored schools or courses of
study.297 Specifically, the proposal usually is to disfavor schools or
courses of study whose graduates are less likely to make enough to repay
the loans.298
The Department pursued this course for nondegree programs and pro-
grams at for-profit colleges when it adopted its “gainful employment
rule,” a form of screening for lending.299 After a change in administra-
tion, the Department announced its intention to abandon the policy,300
highlighting the question of screening’s long-term political viability.
Moreover, expanded screening probably requires congressional interven-
tion. The statutory basis for the gainful employment rule would not apply
to degree programs at public and nonprofit institutions.301
P6QS-QHA7] (describing introduction of legislation to implement Senator Elizabeth War-
ren’s student debt relief proposal). Other candidates’ proposals call for legislation. See Far-
rington, supra note 139 (reviewing candidates’ positions as of April 2019); see also Allie
Conti, What Would It Take for the Next President to Cancel All Student Debt?, VICE (Aug.
27, 2019, 10:22 AM) https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a35ve5/what-it-would-take-for-the-
next-president-to-cancel-all-student-debt [https://perma.cc/EP8N-HCQ9] (reporting that
Senator Bernie Sanders and Senator Warren propose to accomplish their forgiveness plans
through legislation, but describing argument of writer and activist Alan Collinge that the
president can forgive direct federal student loans on the ground that “[t]he money for this
was already appropriated when the loans were made”).
297. See Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527,
625 (2013).
298. See id. (“[C]ertain majors . . . are much lower risk than others. . . . Risk-based
pricing of student loans would encourage more college students to choose majors that
would better prepare them for post-graduation employment opportunities.”).
299. The Department adopted its so-called “gainful employment rule” in 2014 after the
courts had rejected an earlier version of the rule. See generally Program Integrity: Gainful
Employment, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,890 (Oct. 31, 2014) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 600, 668). The
rule provided that programs subject to the gainful-employment requirement would lose
eligibility for federal student-loan funds if certain ratios designed to measure students’ abil-
ity to repay loans fell below certain levels. See id. at 64,891.
300. On August 10, 2018, the Department announced a Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing that would “rescind Gainful Employment (GE) regulations.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Proposes Overhaul of Gainful Employment Reg-
ulations (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-
proposes-overhaul-gainful-employment-regulations [https://perma.cc/739R-9UXC]. As of
December 2018, the Department’s efforts to rescind the regulations reportedly had stum-
bled due to a missed deadline, but the Department was not enforcing the regulations, citing
difficulties getting information necessary to do so. Some observers were skeptical of the
Department’s explanation. See Andrew Kreighbaum, Agencies at Loggerheads Over Gain-
ful-Employment Data, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2018/12/06/education-department-says-data-dispute-behind-failure-enforce-gainful-
employment [https://perma.cc/2BDZ-N86X].
301. Such programs are not subject to the requirement, applicable to nondegree pro-
grams and proprietary and vocational institutions, that their programs lead to “gainful
employment.” See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(4), 1001(b)(1), 1002(b)(1)(A)(i), 1002(c)(1)(A),
1087a(a) (2012). The Department has interpreted “gainful employment” in this context to
mean “provid[ing] . . . training . . . that lead[s] to earnings that will allow students to pay
back their student loan debts.” Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 79 Fed. Reg. at
64,890. Courts have upheld this interpretation. See Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs.
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More fundamental for our discussion here, screening does not com-
pletely address the problems of nondischargeable debt. Even with a
highly effective screening program, some educational investments will
fail, and those student borrowers will need bankruptcy. And even if
screening makes it highly likely that loans will be paid back, students who
are averse to debt for nonfinancial reasons may still be deterred from
higher education.302 In addition, because screening works by discouraging
the study of less remunerative fields, it in itself interferes with accom-
plishing Congress’s goal of freedom of career choice.303
Bankruptcy relief can be expanded by courts and by the Department
under current law without congressional intervention. Either courts or
the Department could interpret “undue hardship” more generously,304
and the Department could be more lenient in consenting to bankruptcy
discharge.305 The Department has indicated interest in the latter,306 in
contrast to its silence about the possibility of expanding IDR. To be sure,
statutory expansion of the availability of bankruptcy307 relief and broad-
based student loan forgiveness308 could help prospective and existing bor-
v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 190 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, 640 Fed. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
302. For example, one possible cause of debt aversion is prior bad family experiences
with credit. See Boatman et al., supra note 124, at 3–4. To the extent such experiences tend
to cause the prospective borrower to overestimate the risk of failure, nondischargeability
plausibly contributes to debt aversion and increasing the chance of success may not address
the problem.
303. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
304. See Hunt, supra note 38.
305. See id.
306. See Request for Information on Evaluating Undue Hardship Claims in Adversary
Actions Seeking Student Loan Discharge in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 83 Fed. Reg. 7460,
7461 (Feb. 21, 2018).
307. As of November 20, 2019, at least four bills to eliminate student-loan nondis-
chargeability are reportedly pending in both houses of Congress. See Student Borrower
Bankruptcy Relief Act of 2019, S. 1414, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (removing student-loan
nondischargeability provision from Bankruptcy Code); Discharge Student Loans in Bank-
ruptcy Act of 2019, H.R. 770, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (same); Student Loan Debt Relief
Act of 2019, S. 2235, 116th Cong. § 301 (2019) (same); Student Loan Debt Relief Act of
2019, H.R. 3887, § 301 (2019) (same). Also, as of November 20, none of these bills have
emerged from committee. See S. 1414: Student Borrower Bankruptcy Relief Act of 2019,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/s1414 [https://perma.cc/8MHJ-
BQQN] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (tracking S. 1414); H.R. 770-Discharge Student Loans
in Bankruptcy Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/
house-bill/770/text [https://perma.cc/BH5L-Q6HG] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (tracking
H.R. 770); S. 2235-Student Borrower Bankruptcy Relief Act of 2019, GOVTRACK, https://
www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2235?s=5&r=1 [https://perma.cc/X89D-
SGPJ] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019) (tracking S. 2235); H.R. 3887-Student Borrower Bank-
ruptcy Relief Act of 2019, GOVTRACK, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/3887?s=4&r=2 [https://perma.cc/6NN9-3VHJ] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (tracking
H.R. 3887); see also ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, § 1.01(a) (recom-
mending changes to Bankruptcy Code to make three categories of student loans discharge-
able without a showing of undue-hardship: loans that have been in repayment for seven
years; were not made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental unit; or were not incurred
for the debtor’s own education); ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that
the reintroduction of dischargeability without undue hardship after seven years is “the cen-
terpiece of the Commission’s recommendation”).
308. See discussion supra note 296 and accompanying text.
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rowers dramatically. But particularly given the uncertainty that either will
come to pass, it is worthwhile to discuss what courts and the Department
can do now.
C. LIMITING INTERFERENCE WITH STUDENT-LOAN PROGRAM GOALS
Part IV.C presents four concrete suggestions for reducing the harm
nondischargeability inflicts. First, dischargeability should be salient to re-
duce deterrence of education. Second, to reduce distortion of career
choice, when debtors are working in fields for which their education has
prepared them, discharge should not be denied on the ground that they
should change jobs and make more money. Third, to combat debt over-
hang, discharge should be granted to debtors who are particularly likely
to be discouraged by their debts; these might be debtors with high debt-
income ratios. Fourth, to reduce the incidence of harmful student loans,
discharge should be granted where student loans probably have harmed
the debtor and the debtor has acted in good faith. The article proposes a
test for likely harm.
Each suggestion is specifically tied to one negative effect of nondis-
chargeability described in Part III. Although some of these suggestions,
particularly the third and fourth, would significantly change the current
application of bankruptcy law, it might be argued that a more general
approach may also be desirable. This author agrees, and takes up in a
companion piece how the undue-hardship test itself might be refashioned
to take account of the overall purposes of the student-loan programs.309
1. Deterrence of Education: Make Dischargeability Salient
As discussed, the discharge of at least some educational loans would
advance the purposes of the student-loan programs.310 Official policy
should encourage debtors who need bankruptcy relief to seek it and
should inform prospective borrowers that such relief may be available if
they need it. Scholars have previously argued for increasing public aware-
ness of income-driven repayment,311 and the terms of education loans
generally,312 and have called for publicizing recommended changes that
would make discharge more available.313 This article makes the same call
for better information about borrowers’ options, including bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, the incorrect notion that it is impossible to discharge
309. See Hunt, supra note 281.
310. See discussion supra Part III.
311. See Boatman & Evans, supra note 124, at 64 (suggesting such awareness could
“enhance higher-education enrollment rates”).
312. See Laura W. Perna et al., Understanding Student Debt: Implications for Federal
Policy and Future Research, 671 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 270, 275 (2017)
(arguing that ensuring that students are well informed about student loans should be a
priority).
313. See Jime´nez et al., supra note 6, at 118–19 (recommending posting revised guide-
lines on Department website).
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student loans in bankruptcy circulates widely,314 and even official sources
such as the Department’s website do not do all they could to correct this
idea. For instance, the website presents a table with various possible types
of discharge and forgiveness with the notation “in rare cases” applied to
bankruptcy discharge and only bankruptcy discharge.315 It is true that
bankruptcy relief is “rare,” in the sense that only a tiny fraction of student
loans are discharged in bankruptcy. But it is not true that bankruptcy
relief is rarely granted when it is actually requested, as many academic
studies have shown.316 Users would be better served by a more complete
disclosure.
The same recommendation applies to other statements on the Depart-
ment’s website317 and in other Department publications.318 The Depart-
ment could also encourage the disclosure of more complete bankruptcy
information at students’ mandatory entrance and exit counseling
sessions.319
The Department could also increase bankruptcy salience by adopting
clear, bright-line rules governing when it will consent to discharge and
disseminating these rules broadly.320 Indeed, the interest in salience
314. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
315. Forgiveness, Cancellation, and Discharge, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed
.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation [https://perma.cc/2VU9-JYNB] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2019).
316. See Hunt, supra note 38 (surveying studies indicating rates of relief for student
debtors ranging from 39% to 57%).
317. Discharge in Bankruptcy, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-
loans/forgiveness-cancellation/bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/2ERZ-YKSQ] (last visited
Oct. 14, 2019) (“In some cases, you can have your federal student loan discharged after
declaring bankruptcy. However, discharge in bankruptcy is not an automatic process.”).
318. See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FUNDING YOUR EDUCATION: THE
GUIDE TO FEDERAL STUDENT AID, 2012–13, at 12 (2011) (“Student loans aren’t easily
written off in bankruptcy.”). The final statement is technically accurate, given the need to
bring an adversary proceeding and establish undue hardship in order to get a discharge.
However, the publication is arguably misleading. It does not let users know that discharge
is not “rare” for debtors who actually seek it. Moreover, the publication states that “finan-
cial difficulty” is not a basis for cancelation, even though such difficulty is a key part of the
undue-hardship analysis. Id.
319. The Department apparently does not currently provide for schools to provide
complete bankruptcy information, at least at exit counseling. See FED. STUDENT AID, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., DIRECT LOAN EXIT COUNSELING GUIDE 21 (2018) (“Federal loans are
not generally included in debts eliminated under personal bankruptcy.”).
320. See ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 1 (proposing bright-line rules);
Bruckner et al., supra note 6, at 6–7 (proposing bright-line rules); id. at 46–63 (explaining
and defending bright-line rule proposal); Jime´nez et al., supra note 6, at 115 (proposing
bright-line rules). The paper by Bruckner, Gotberg, Jime´nez, and Ondersma refines and
elaborates on the proposal in the paper by Jime´nez, Bruckner, Foohey, Gotberg, and On-
dersma. Compare Jime´nez et al., supra note 6, at 115, with Bruckner et al., supra note 6, at
6. The ABI Commission Report proposal overlaps with the proposal of Bruckner and co-
authors, but is broader in some ways (e.g., it permits a poverty-based discharge based on
income at 175%, rather than 150%, of the poverty level) and narrower in others (e.g., it
requires seven years of low income, rather than just four, for discharge). Compare ABI
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, with Bruckner et al., supra note 6, at 6. For an-
other proposal, see Hunt, supra note 38 (recommending adoption of bright-line rules
generally).
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might even justify adopting rules that are simpler than those that other-
wise would be adopted.
This article presents evidence that lower-income, LatinX, and possibly
Asian-American students are more likely to be debt-averse,321 and that
student debt is more likely to harm African-American, LatinX, and Na-
tive borrowers.322 Given the greater probability of harm, it seems that
nondischargeability is more likely to deter members of these groups from
education. Accordingly, the Department should consider targeted out-
reach to these groups to increase bankruptcy’s salience to them.323
Increasing salience does not in itself make discharge more generous, so
it would not undermine the core purposes of conditional nondis-
chargeability: combating borrower abuse and promoting financial recov-
ery.324 Increasing salience should make bankruptcy more common, but
the only debtors who will benefit are those who are suffering undue hard-
ship. Having debtors endure undue hardship simply because they are not
aware of bankruptcy does not serve the purposes of the nondis-
chargeability provision.
2. Distortion of Careers: Let Borrowers Work in Fields for Which
They Have Been Trained
Perhaps the clearest case of conflict between the goals of the student-
loan programs and nondischargeability occurs when the borrower is suc-
cessfully employed in a lower-paying field for which she has been trained
and the court denies student-loan discharge because it believes that the
borrower should find higher-paying work outside that field (the Gerhardt
scenario).325 Here, the court is effectively telling the debtor not just to get
a different job, but also not to use the education the student loans have
financed.
In a case where the debtor is working in the field for which the debtor
is trained and the court denies discharge because the debtor could make
more money at another job in that field (the Oyler scenario),326 the con-
flict between nondischargeability and the purposes of the student-loan
programs is slightly less stark because nondischargeability does not inter-
fere with using the education at all, but nondischargeability still interferes
with the borrower’s freedom of career choice.
The policy conflict plays out here in individual bankruptcy cases: the
court is condemning the choices of the debtor before it and in the process
setting repayment above other goals of the student-loan programs. Judges
create the problem, and judges can solve it. They should simply stop dis-
321. See discussion Part III.A.1.
322. See discussion Part III.D.
323. Cf. NAT. SCI. FOUND., NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION’S DIVERSITY AND INCLU-
SION STRATEGIC PLAN 2012–2016, at 9–10 (2011) (describing targeted outreach efforts at
NSF).
324. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
325. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
326. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
774 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
regarding debtors’ low incomes on the basis of second-guessing the debt-
ors’ career choices.
The concept of “the field for which one is trained” is not sharply de-
fined in all respects. Some degrees—for example, in counseling,327 educa-
tion,328 or musical performance329—are clearly fitted to certain
occupations. Other fields of study, such as philosophy, may not be tied
directly to particular occupations but may help students in a wide variety
of fields of endeavor. Such cases are closer, but Congress’s purposes are
served by leniency regarding discharge whenever education is reasonably
calculated to, or actually does, benefit the debtor in the debtor’s current
occupation.
It may be objected that protecting the debtor’s choice to study and
work in lower-paying fields encourages borrowers to pursue “worthless
degrees.” Professor Glater, among others, has criticized the money-first
premise of this viewpoint on the merits.330 This author endorses that line
of thinking. Members of Congress did not couch the expressions of sup-
port for education and educational choice presented in this article in
purely monetary terms. At least as regards degree programs at public and
nonprofit institutions,331 the framers of the HEA did not say, “We want a
population educated with degrees that pay off financially for the individu-
als who got the degrees.” Instead, the record reveals an interest in educa-
tion and access generally.332 Indeed, the programs have been designed
specifically to recognize the value of lower-paid but valuable work.333 To
be sure, sometimes Congress has intended to promote particular areas of
endeavor,334 but these were not defined in terms of a financial payoff.
Adopting this proposal runs no serious risk of encouraging abuse or
materially reducing financial recovery. People like Jonathon Gerhardt
327. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4980.36(b) (West 2019) (requiring a master’s
or doctoral degree in a specified field as a prerequisite to becoming a marriage, family, and
child counselor in California).
328. See John Fensterwald, Undergraduate Education Major, Banned for 56 Years, Re-
turns, EDSOURCE (Aug. 10, 2017), https://edsource.org/2017/undergraduate-education-ma-
jor-banned-for-56-years-returns/585830 [https://perma.cc/N9GZ-4S7R] (reporting that
students pursuing education major can become teachers in four years, instead of five or
six).
329. See, e.g., Bachelor in Arts in Music Program Learning Objectives, U.S. CAL.
THORNTON SCH. MUSIC, https://music.usc.edu/files/2016/06/USCThornton_LearningObjec
tives_BA_Music.pdf [https://perma.cc/T445-64QS] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (“Upon com-
pletion of the Bachelor of Arts in Music program, students will: a. have the ability to per-
form in at least one major performance area or instrument at a professional entry level.”).
330. See Jonathan D. Glater, Law and the Conundrum of Higher Education Quality, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1211, 1253–54 (2018) (“Something is lost when the law endorses the
view that higher education is a purely private good”; citing other scholars who have ex-
pressed similar views).
331. For nondegree programs and programs at private for-profit institutions, Congress
has required that education prepare the student for gainful employment in a recognized
occupation to be eligible for federal loans. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
332. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
333. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
334. For example, the National Defense Education Act aimed at developing skills in
technical fields and foreign languages. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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and Cynthia Matthews-Hamad who are successfully using their training
but not making enough money to pay off loans335 are not abusing the
system; they are not like professionals who discharge their loans right on
the cusp of enormous earnings.
On the subject of financial recovery, it is critical that such debtors
would have to meet the relevant criteria for undue hardship to get a dis-
charge; the only change would be that discharge would no longer be de-
nied on the ground that “good faith” requires a job change. Under the
prevailing Brunner test, for example, they would have to show that repay-
ment would entail inability to maintain a minimal standard of living for a
substantial portion of the repayment period.336 Such debtors seem un-
likely to provide enough in the way of loan payments net of collection
costs to outweigh the harm discharge denial inflicts through interfering
with accomplishing the purposes of the loan programs.
3. Discouragement of Borrowers: Consider Debt-Income Ratio
As discussed, the idea that unmanageable debt discourages people
from economic activity and from social participation more broadly is a
premise of the American bankruptcy system.337 When student borrowers
are so discouraged, unmanageable student loans deprive society of the
benefit of the borrower’s education, distort the borrower’s career choices,
and may be a source of harm to students. All three effects frustrate the
purposes of the federal student-loan programs.
Given the importance of the debt-overhang premise, one might expect
courts evaluating undue hardship to grant discharge more freely to bor-
rowers who are more likely to be deterred from economic activity. How-
ever, the empirical evidence can be read to suggest essentially the
opposite. Sicker,338 and perhaps older,339 debtors are more likely to get a
335. See discussion supra Part III.B.
336. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (identifying elements of Brunner test).
337. See discussion supra Part III.C.
338. See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the
Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495, 518 (2012) (“Medical hardship is posi-
tively correlated with receipt of a discharge.”); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The
Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J.
179, 216 (2009) [hereinafter Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal] (“[D]ebtor or
debtor’s dependent suffering from a medical condition” is statistically-significantly associ-
ated with extent of debt discharged); Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy
Courts, supra note 264, at 485 tbl.8 (finding the fraction of debtors granted discharge who
were unhealthy (71.70%) was higher than fraction of debtors denied discharge who were
unhealthy (53.68%); p = 0.0051). Age may also be a factor in holders’ willingness to com-
promise with student debtors. See Aaron N. Taylor & Daniel J. Sheffner, Oh, What a Relief
It (Sometimes) Is: An Analysis of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions to Discharge Student
Loans, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 295, 329 tbl.13 (2016) (reporting that in sample of settled
cases from 2011 to 2014 in which reasons for settlement were expressed, age was explicitly
mentioned as a reason for settlement in 22% of First Circuit cases and 24% of Third Cir-
cuit cases).
339. See Iuliano, supra note 338, at 516 fig.5 (showing that in nationwide sample of
cases from 2007, reporting significantly higher percentage of debt discharged for debtors
over sixty than for debtors under sixty); Taylor & Sheffner, supra note 338, at 326 tbl.11 &
n.132 (2016) (noting in a sample of First Circuit decisions from 2005 to 2014 where debtor’s
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student-loan discharge. Without making undue assumptions about disa-
bility and age, it at least seems plausible that such borrowers may be less
likely to be able to work even after receiving a discharge of debt.
By contrast, consider borrowers with high debt levels. All else equal,
high debt might seem more likely to be unmanageable and therefore to
discourage borrowers from productive activity. Yet it appears that a high
ratio of student debt to income does not lead to discharge.340 There is
even an intriguing finding in one study that debtors who are denied dis-
charge have higher debts than those who are granted discharge.341
The point is not that old, sick debtors should not get discharges. It cer-
tainly seems likely that such debtors are likely to suffer more serious
hardship than others if discharge is denied. Instead, the argument is that
discharge should be more readily available than it currently is to debtors
who are likely to be deterred from economic activity by their debts. These
might be high-debt borrowers and could include young people.
One likely measure of susceptibility to debt overhang is the debt-in-
come ratio. The Department has taken note of research showing that the
debt-income ratio is associated with the borrower’s degree of loan-related
“burden, hardship, and regret.”342 It has determined, on the basis of aca-
demic studies343 and its own analysis of data344 that the debt-income ratio
is a reasonable measure of whether student debt is manageable,345 and
age could be discerned, debtor’s age was fifty-seven in cases where age was cited to
debtor’s benefit and forty-four in other cases). On the other hand, a study of student-loan
discharge proceedings in the Western District of Washington from 2002 to 2006 found no
statistically significant relationship between debtor age and percentage of debt discharged,
although it apparently did find a relationship that was not significant. See Pardo & Lacey,
The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 338, at 217 tbl.4; see also Pardo & Lacey, Un-
due Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 264, at 482 (reporting no statistically
significant difference in the age of debtors to whom discharge was granted and those to
whom discharge was denied).
340. See Pardo, supra note 6, at 1144, 1159, 1186 (reporting, based on nationwide sam-
ple of 395 discharge proceedings filed in 2011 and 2012, that “no statistically significant
relationship” exists between debtor success and any financial characteristic of debtors ex-
amined in the study (including educational-debt-to-income ratio) and that debtors who
succeeded in bankruptcy litigation had higher median and lower mean educational-debt-
to-income ratios than debtors who did not succeed); Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-
Loan Scandal, supra note 338, at 215 (reporting that debt-to-income ratio, like other finan-
cial characteristics examined, “is not statistically significantly associated with the extent of
discharge obtained by the debtor”); Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy
Courts, supra note 264, at 483–84 (finding no statistically significant difference in debt-to-
income ratio between debtors who received discharge and debtors who did not).
341. See Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts, supra note 264, at
484 tbl.7 (stating that median educational debt (presumably in 2003 dollars) was $28,740
for debtors granted discharge and $34,240 for debtors denied discharge; p = 0.29). Perhaps
we should not make too much of this finding, which was not statistically significant and
appears in an older study that examined only reported decisions.
342. Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 79 Fed. Reg. 64,890, 64,914 (Oct. 31,
2014) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 600 & 668).
343. See id. at 64,921 & nn.119–22.
344. See id. at 64,920.
345. See id. at 64,914.
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the courts have sustained this determination.346 Empirical research on
credit card debt,347 which is easier to discharge than student debt,348 has
linked high debt-income ratios to worse health349 and to anxiety.350
It thus appears probable that borrowers with high debt-income ratios
become discouraged from working and investing, as well as from social
participation. The Department might consider a high debt-income ratio
as a factor supporting consent to discharge, or even creating a rebuttable
presumption351 of consent to discharge when the ratio exceeds a pre-
scribed level.352 Courts might consider taking account of the debt-income
ratio in similar ways in contested cases.
This article proposes using the debt-income ratio in the dischargeability
analysis only as a single factor or to create a rebuttable presumption. Be-
cause of this limited use of the concept, considering the ratio is unlikely
to interfere significantly with the purposes of the limitation on
dischargeability.353
The debt-income ratio used in isolation admittedly could enable the
kind of abuse that motivated Congress to enact nondischargeability. A
recent graduate with a currently low income could discharge debts and
then enjoy a higher income free of the obligation to repay.354 However,
346. See Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 110 F. Supp. 3d 176, 191
(D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting contention that Department’s use of debt-income ratio as a mea-
sure of loan manageability was arbitrary and capricious), aff’d, 640 F. App’x 5 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
347. Patricia Drentea, Age, Debt and Anxiety, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 437, 441
(2000); Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the Limit: The Association Among
Health, Race and Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517, 521 (2000).
348. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018) (providing undue-hardship requirement only for
education-related debts).
349. Drentea & Lavrakas, supra note 347, at 527. Another study, using a different sam-
ple and different statistical techniques, attempted to determine the direction of causation
and found that “health status may play a more important role in explaining why some
households are under financial strain than vice versa.” Angela C. Lyons & Tansel Yilmazer,
Health and Financial Strain: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 71 S. ECON.
J. 873, 875 (2005).
350. Drentea, supra note 347, at 445.
351. Cf. Bruckner et al., supra note 6, at 37 (calling for rebuttable presumption of un-
due hardship when certain objectively defined criteria are met).
352. If full discharge were thought to give a windfall to high-debt borrowers, the De-
partment could, in cases where the debt is federal, compromise such debts to bring them
down to acceptable debt-to-income levels. In other cases, bankruptcy courts could achieve
the same result by granting partial discharge, at least in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Sax-
man v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. BJR Corp. (In re Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that Bankruptcy Code permits partial discharge of student-loan debt); Tenn. Stu-
dent Assististance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 1998)
(same). Another approach to the issue would be to require some prescribed period of time
before discharge.
353. See Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All Presump-
tions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697, 707–08 (1984) (describing varying effects of presumptions based
on strength of policies underlying them); Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and
Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779, 814 (2011) (nothing in the patent context, “The lessons of
the Supreme Court have shown that . . . the use of rebuttable presumptions [is] an appro-
priate way to balance competing policy concerns.”).
354. For congressional disapproval of such behavior, see 124 CONG. REC. 1793 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Erlenborn) (“Having pledged that future earning power, if, shortly af-
778 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
this article contemplates that a creditor would be able to overcome the
debtor’s high debt-income ratio if the creditor could demonstrate that the
debtor would earn more in the future.
The proposal also is unlikely to materially harm creditor recovery.
Scholars have noted that debtors are unlikely to repay, at least in full,
when debt-income ratios are high.355 Especially when collection costs are
taken into account, discharge of much of this debt probably has no real
cost to creditors. However, as with the possibility of abuse, under the
proposal, creditors would be permitted to try to rebut the presumption by
showing that the current debt-income ratio does not present a fair picture
of likely future earnings.
4. Harm to Borrowers: Allow Discharge of Debts That Made
Borrowers Worse Off
As discussed, Congress intended student loans to benefit students, not
harm them.356 But in fact, many borrowers are probably worse off be-
cause they pursued debt-financed education.357 Denying such students
discharge frustrates Congress’s purpose in creating the student-loan
programs.
Curiously, the prevailing tests for bankruptcy discharge, the Brunner
and totality-of-the-circumstances tests, do not expressly take account of
whether student loans helped or harmed the debtor.358 It was not always
this way. An early leading decision on student-loan bankruptcy, Penn-
sylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency v. Johnson (In re John-
son),359 advanced an analytical framework including a “policy test,”
ter graduation and before having an opportunity to get assets to repay the debt, [the gradu-
ate] seeks to discharge that obligation, I say that is tantamount to fraud.”).
355. See Pardo & Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 338, at 208 (assert-
ing that the typical debtor in one study, which found a mean debt-to-income ratio of 4.7,
“did not have a reasonable prospect of repaying her student loans”).
356. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
357. See discussion supra Part III.D.
358. The most widely used test, the Brunner test, considers whether the debtor would
be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living for a significant portion of the repay-
ment period while repaying the loans and whether the debtor made a good faith effort to
repay. See supra notes 119–121 and accompanying text (discussing elements and influence
of Brunner test). Some courts that have adopted the Brunner test have expressly rejected
consideration of whether the debtor actually derived a benefit from the student loans. In re
Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Such an inquiry conflicts with the basic
concept of government-backed student loans.”); see also Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 1995) (agreeing with Roberson).
The less widely used test, the totality-of-the-circumstances test, permits consideration of
“the unique facts and circumstances that surround the particular bankruptcy.” Fern v.
FedLoan Servicing (In re Fern), 563 B.R. 1, 3 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2017). It thus would seem to
permit consideration of whether the debtor benefited from the loan if the court deemed
the issue relevant. It does not appear, however, that courts employing the totality-of-the-
circumstances test generally do consider whether the loans were helpful or harmful. See id.
at 4 (listing factors considered in applying totality-of-the-circumstances test and not listing
question whether loan benefited the borrower).
359. No. 77-2033TT, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 1979).
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which asked whether the loans financially benefited the borrower.360
Courts regularly applied this framework for some time.361
To be sure, the Johnson test has now been displaced by the Brunner
and totality-of-the-circumstances tests,362 which are followed in almost all
circuits.363 Most of the appellate decisions adopting the current tests did
so without mentioning Johnson’s policy test.
As for the two appellate courts that expressly rejected Johnson in favor
of Brunner, they did not consider nondischargeability in light of the over-
all purposes of the student-loan program as this article recommends. In-
stead, they relied on the unsupported assertion that the government was
not an “insurer” of student success,364 so that the risk of failure falls on
the student. The use of the word “insurer” in this context is somewhat
inaccurate, given that the debtor must go through bankruptcy, liquidate
nonexempt property,365 and suffer other consequences to get a dis-
charge.366 More fundamentally, the courts were wrong to assume it was
self-evident that Congress was indifferent to the fate of unlucky borrow-
360. Under Johnson’s somewhat convoluted analysis, if the debtor could not afford to
pay the student loans but the inability was the result of the debtor’s own negligence or
irresponsibility, then the “policy test” would determine the outcome. Id. at *60–61. Under
the policy test, if the debtor’s dominant purpose in filing bankruptcy was not the discharge
of student loans, then the debtor would get a discharge if the loans did not provide a
financial benefit and would not get a discharge if the loans did provide a financial benefit.
Id.
361. Except where otherwise noted, the following cases applied the Johnson test. In the
interest of space, bankruptcy court decisions applying the Johnson test from 1979 through
1995 are omitted. See Morris v. United States (In re Morris), No. 99-05944-TOM-7, 2000
Bankr. LEXIS 1643, at *18-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2000) (granting discharge where
debtor “has not benefitted from the computer science degree he gained as a result of re-
ceiving the student loans”); McCormick v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re McCormick),
No. 99-00636-TOM-7, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1645, at *14 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 4, 2000);
Roe v. Law Unit (In re Roe), 226 B.R. 258, 269 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998); Miller v. Benton
State Bank (In re Miller), No. 96-11061 S, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 377, at *2 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. Feb. 19, 1997) (stating “courts generally employ” Johnson test); Holtorf v. Ill. Student
Assistance Comm’n (In re Holtorf), 204 B.R. 567, 572 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997) (finding it
unnecessary to choose between Johnson and Brunner tests because outcome was same
under either); Taylor v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm’n (In re Taylor), 198 B.R. 700, 702
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); Robinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Robinson), 193 B.R. 967,
969–70 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); Howell v. Educ. Res. Inst., Inc. (In re Howell), BK 95-
70202-CMS-7, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1935, at *9, *16 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 5, 1996) (grant-
ing partial discharge where debtor clearly did not benefit from student loans, having re-
turned to previous employment with the Postal Service after graduating law school);
Vaughn v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm’n, 151 B.R. 481, 486 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that
bankruptcy court should have followed Johnson test); In re Roberson, 138 B.R. 885, 888
(N.D. Ill. 1992), rev’d, 999 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he Johnson analysis is the appro-
priate analytical standard to follow.”).
362. See Faish, 72 F.3d at 306 (rejecting Johnson test in favor of Brunner test); Rober-
son, 999 F.2d at 1137 (same).
363. See DOE Letter, supra note 278, at 16 (listing nine circuits that have adopted
Brunner test (the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh)
and one that has adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances test (the Eighth)).
364. Faish, 72 F.3d at 305; Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136.
365. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 700.01 (Lawrence E. King et al. eds., 16th ed.
rev. 2019).
366. For example, it may be harder for the debtor to get credit after bankruptcy. See
POND, PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING HANDBOOK ¶ 5.09[4] (2d ed. 2019).
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ers. As this article has shown,367 Congress’s purpose was to help students,
not to harm them. Taking Congress’s intent to benefit students into ac-
count, as a proper analysis would, suggests that courts were wrong to
abandon the policy test and that it should be restored in some form.
Whether loans harmed a debtor is not always obvious. The inquiry is
subjective, involving both financial and nonfinancial considerations. The
following is one possible conservative way of implementing the debtor-
harm standard.
If a course of study is designed to lead to particular employment, then
the debtor could be presumed harmed if unable with reasonable effort to
find a job in the field in a reasonable time. A debtor who found a job in
the relevant field would be presumed unharmed.
If the course of study is not designed to prepare for a particular career,
a test designed around net-economic benefit would be reasonable. It
might be presumed that the education and loans created a net harm when
the borrower’s income, less loan payments,368 is less than the median for
a person of the same age in the same geographic area whose education is
the same as the borrower’s was before the borrower undertook the debt-
financed education in question.369 For example, the holder of an under-
graduate degree in philosophy would be presumed harmed if and only if
the debtor’s income were less than that of the median high-school gradu-
ate of the same age living in that area.
Recognizing that applying a debtor-harm standard may be a significant
shift from current practice in most courts, the proposal above is deliber-
ately cautious. For example, the fact that a debtor is working in the field
for which the debtor was educated may indicate that the education pro-
vided a benefit, but it does not necessarily establish that the education
and loans together provided a net benefit. Presuming the debtor was not
harmed in this instance is conservative. The same-age-median-income test
does not take account of the harm that may arise from loss of seniority
arising from taking time off for school, so it too is a conservative ap-
proach to net harm.
Different actors could take different approaches to implementing the
debtor-harm standard in light of current law. A court of appeals sitting en
367. See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
368. In cases where the debtor does or can reduce payments using IDR, use of pay-
ments on the standard repayment plan is arguably appropriate because IDR extends the
repayment period, may not actually result in loan cancellation, may impose tax liabilities if
loans are cancelled, and allows negative amortization of the loans during repayment. See
ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 12 (recommending use of the “contractual
terms of the loan itself,” rather than IDR plan terms, in evaluating hardship); Hunt, supra
note 86, at 1329 tbl.1 (listing potential drawbacks of IDR).
369. The Census Department’s Current Population Survey collects data on earnings,
age, education, and location. See Current Population Survey: Technical Documentation:
Questionnaires, CENSUS.GOV, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-docu
mentation/questionnaires.html [https://perma.cc/CQ3Q-VLQY] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
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banc370 or the Department371 would not be bound by the Brunner or to-
tality-of-the-circumstances test and could simply decide that debtor harm
constitutes undue hardship, perhaps with an additional requirement that
the debtor act in good faith.
Most bankruptcy courts, district courts, and appellate panels currently
must follow the Brunner test for undue hardship,372 which does not ex-
pressly call for consideration of debtor harm. It is the author’s sense that
most bankruptcy courts do not consider debtor harm in applying the
Brunner standard,373 and at least three appellate courts (the Third,374
Sixth,375 and Seventh Circuits376) have expressly rejected considering the
issue.
In other jurisdictions, however, the debtor-harm standard potentially
can be reconciled with Brunner. The Brunner test asks whether repay-
ment would likely render the debtor unable to maintain a “minimal stan-
dard of living” for a significant portion of the repayment period and
whether the debtor acted in good faith.377 A minimal standard of living
could be understood to be a standard of living at least as high as the
borrower would have enjoyed absent the loans.378 This approach does not
370. See Catherine T. Struve, When Hearing or Rehearing En Banc May Be Ordered, in
16AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 3981.1 (4th ed. 2018) (“[O]ne reason to grant en banc consideration is to overrule
circuit precedent.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis in United States Courts, in 18
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02 (3d ed. 2019) (“[A] circuit court panel’s decision
may be overruled by the court sitting en banc.”) (collecting cases).
371. The Department’s interpretation of undue hardship is important because the De-
partment’s current interpretation of its regulations, although not completely clear, proba-
bly is that holders of federal student loans “should consent” to discharge when undue
hardship is present. See DOE Letter, supra note 278, at 10; Hunt, supra note 38 (explaining
ambiguity in DOE Letter and suggesting that “should consent” is controlling).
372. See DOE Letter, supra note 278, at 16 (describing adoption of Brunner test in most
circuits).
373. See, e.g., Salyer v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Salyer), No. 05-14253, 2006
Bankr. LEXIS 2050, at *17–18 (Bankr. M.D. La. Aug. 31, 2006) (“A debtor’s failure to . . .
benefit financially from a financed education is not a separate mitigating consideration in
deciding whether a student loan obligation is dischargeable.”). But see Swafford v. King (In
re Swafford), 604 B.R. 46, 52–53 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2019) (considering mental and emo-
tional harm to debtor from mounting debt).
374. See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 305 (3d
Cir. 1995).
375. See Rice v. United States (In re Rice), 78 F.3d 1144, 1150 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996). Rice
v. United States (In re Rice) involved HEAL loans, which are dischargeable only on a
showing of “unconscionab[ility],” 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g)(2) (2012), which has been described
as a higher standard than undue hardship. Id. at 1149.
376. See, e.g., In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993).
377. See Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)
(per curiam).
378. As many courts have observed, the concept of a “minimal standard of living” al-
lows for considerable flexibility. See, e.g., Halatek v. William D. Ford Fed. Direct Loan
Program (In re Halatek), 592 B.R. 86, 98 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2018) (quoting Johnson v. Ac-
cess Group (In re Johnson), 400 B.R. 167, 173 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009)) (“A minimal stan-
dard of living—‘is not a fixed measure, and the concept is not defined by bright lines.’”);
Doernte v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Doernte), No. 10-24280-JAD, 2017 Bankr.
LEXIS 1407, at *10 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. May 25, 2017) (using the same quote); Jones v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Jones), 495 B.R. 674, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2013) (using the same
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preclude considering the nonfinancial benefits of education and harms of
debt, as “standard of living” can be interpreted to encompass such mat-
ters.379 In applying this concept of a minimal standard of living, courts
could use the presumptions suggested above or adopt other approaches.
Courts unwilling to allow debtor harm to satisfy the minimal-standard-of-
living element of Brunner could at a minimum consider debtor harm as a
factor in evaluating whether the debtor acted in good faith, as some
courts already do.380
Allowing discharge based on debtor harm does not promote abuse of
the system. The abusers Congress was concerned with were those who
were likely to benefit from loans and did not want to repay,381 not those
who suffered harm from their loans.
Discharge based on debtor harm has a more delicate relationship with
protecting creditor financial recovery, the other reason for conditional
nondischargeability of student loans. A debtor may be harmed by student
loans but still enjoy considerable ability to repay, perhaps because of suc-
cess in a field unrelated to the loan-financed education. Thus, adopting
debtor harm as a basis for discharge does entail some risk to creditor
recovery.
Nevertheless, a central argument of this article is that nondis-
chargeability’s purposes do not always and everywhere trump other pur-
poses of the student-loan programs.382 Given that those who are harmed
by student loans are probably less likely on average to be able to repay
than those who are helped, courts and the Department could reasonably
decide that the purpose of not harming borrowers outweighs the purpose
of promoting recovery. Even if decision-makers are not inclined to go
that far, they should give some weight to borrower harm. For example,
they could allow harmed borrowers under a certain income level to get a
quote); Roundtree-Crawley v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421,
436 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011).
379. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11 (2011)
(“The [Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938] seeks to prohibit ‘labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers.’”) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012)); Reed v. PST Vans,
No. 97-5097, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17928, at *12 (6th Cir. July 31, 1998) (defining “stan-
dard of living” in terms of maintaining “such a condition of health and well-being that [one
can] maintain [one’s] capacity to enjoy life’s activities”); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art.
25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.”).
380. See, e.g., Fields v. Sallie Mae Servs. Corp. (In re Fields), 286 Fed. App’x 246,
249–50 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing and quoting Flores v. U.S. Dept. of Educ. (In re Flores), 282
B.R. 847, 856 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002)) (stating that the benefit from loans is one of six
factors relevant to good faith). Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit expressly rejected considera-
tion of whether the debtor received a benefit in construing 42 U.S.C. § 292f(g), a provision
analogous to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) that requires a showing of “unconscionability” for dis-
charge of certain student loans in the healthcare field. See Rice, 78 F.3d at 1150 n.6.
381. See Hunt, supra note 86, at 1301–07; Pardo & Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bank-
ruptcy Courts, supra note 264, at 423–24.
382. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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discharge or allow harmed borrowers more than Brunner’s “minimal”
standard of living.383
V. CONCLUSION
Student-loan nondischargeability can interfere with education, distort
careers, discourage borrowers from economic and social participation,
and make student loans harmful. These effects thwart Congress’s goals
for the student-loan programs: providing equal access to higher educa-
tion, creating an educated population, facilitating free career choice, and
benefiting students. This article suggests concrete steps to remedy nondis-
chargeability’s negative effects: making dischargeability salient; ending
penalization in bankruptcy of borrowers who work in fields for which
they have been educated; granting discharge to debtors who are particu-
larly likely to be discouraged, who may be debtors with high debt-income
ratios; and granting discharge to debtors whose student loans are a harm
rather than benefit, such as debtors who have not been able to find jobs
in the fields for which they were trained despite good faith effort. These
specific proposals should help confine nondischargeability to its proper
place in the statutory scheme and achieve greater fidelity to Congress’s
overall design.
383. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (setting forth elements of Brunner test).
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